WHERE WOMEN CAN HAVE IT ALL?
THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE RISE OF WOMEN
IN THE HIGHER DECILES OF WAGES
IN FRENCH OVERSEAS DEPARTMENTS

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Where women can have it all? The public sector and the rise of women in the higher deciles of wages in French Overseas Departments

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Abstract

In this study, I contribute to the scarce literature on the gender wage gap at the regional level. I provide the first study on the gender wage gap in French Overseas Departments. Some of my findings challenge established results from the literature. Using linked employer-employee data, I apply Oaxaca-Blinder and RIF-Oaxaca decomposition methods and find that women earn more than men on average and at the third quartile. This result stems from a composition effect due to the over-representation of female workers in the overseas public sector, which has been providing a wage premium since the 1950s to state and local governments' civil workers overseas. This wage premium was implemented to face higher living costs in overseas departments. It amounts to an additional 40% in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana and 53% in Reunion.

Keywords : gender wage gap; public-private wage gap; regional labour markets; French Overseas Departments; matched employer-employee data

JEL classifications : J16; J31; J45; E24; R23; O18

1 Introduction

The gender wage gap has been extensively studied in the economics literature. However, most of these studies were conducted at the national level, possibly hiding important local dynamics. Leading contributions at the national scale include Goldin (2006), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016), and Blau and Kahn (2017). They attribute the overall decrease of the gender wage gap to the convergence in human capital between men and women, the greater participation of women in the labor market, and changing social norms.

The objective of this paper is to contribute to the scarce literature that analyzes the gender wage gap at the regional level. A few studies have proven insightful to account for regional disparity and shed light on additional explanatory factors. In Italy, Brown, Popli, and Sasso (2022) attribute the variation between regional gender wage gaps to differences on the supply side, as workers' characteristics differ from one region to another. In Germany, it is instead linked to the differing regional employment opportunities for men and women (Fuchs et al. 2021). In Spain, Huertas, Ramos, and Simon (2017) find that economic, institutional, and demographic elements known to influence cross-country differences in the gender wage gap are also relevant in explaining regional differences. Robinson (2005) shows that the introduction of a minimum wage policy at the national level in Britain had heterogeneous effects on gender wage disparity, as the incidence of low-wage employment varied greatly between regions. For the United States, Goodwin-White (2018) explores the gender wage gap in the top one hundred metro areas. She shows that the general decline in the gender wage gap through the Great Recession was geographically uneven, with inequality at the top rising in the otherwise presumed as relatively equal Western United States.

In this paper, I study the gender wage gap in French Overseas Departments, which are of particular interest as their public wage setting differs from the mainland[1]. Indeed, since the 1950s, tenured civil servants have earned a wage premium overseas (+40% in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana; +53% in Reunion), contributing to inequality at the local level (Govind 2025). Such a distortion of the labor market could in turn affect occupational choices across gender (Lucifora and Meurs 2006; Bargain and Melly 2008).

I use the decomposition method of Oaxaca-Blinder (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) to explain differences at the mean, and the RIF-Oaxaca approach (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 2011) to explore the 75th percentile gap. I use matched employer-employee data and provide analysis over 16 years for Reunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana. To allow for regional comparisons, I also provide results for the Paris region and mainland France without the Paris region.

My contribution is threefold. First, I contribute to the scarce literature on regional disparities in the gender wage gap. Second, I provide, to my knowledge, the first study on the gender wage gap for French Overseas Departments. Finally, some of my findings challenge established results in the literature.

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[1]Meurs and Ponthieux (2004), Meurs, Pailhé, and Ponthieux (2010), Couppié, Dupray, and Moullet (2014) and Tô, Maillard, and Coudin (2018) study the gender wage gap in France, but exclude French Overseas Departments due to data limitations.

I show that the overseas gender wage gap is especially low at the mean compared to mainland levels, and even more so at the third quartile. Women overseas are much more present in the higher deciles of income than their mainland counterparts. In line with the literature on the public-private divide, women in the mainland and overseas tend to self-select into the public sector, and lower-skilled workers are better off in the public sector. However, the overseas public premium wage creates a distortion as the public sector also favors higher-skilled workers overseas, men and women alike. Unlike in the mainland, the composition effect overseas contributes to most of the convergence of men's and women's hourly wages, winning over the unexplained part in recent years. This effect is mainly driven by the over-representation of women in the intermediate professions of the public sector.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the public wage premium. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 introduces the data and provides descriptive evidence of the overseas public premium wage and the gender wage gap. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents robustness checks, and Section 7 explores potential heterogeneous effects. Section 8 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The public wage premium in French Overseas Departments

France is constituted of its mainland territory, as well as five overseas departments and regions, indicated in blue in Figure 1. The islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique form the Antilles in the Caribbean Sea, with 400,000 and 375,000 inhabitants, respectively. French Guiana, in South America, has a population of 294,000. In the Indian Ocean, there are the islands of La Reunion, the most populated one with 881,000 inhabitants, and Mayotte, the least populated with 257,000 inhabitants.

These territories were colonized in the 17th century, before the original Four were assimilated in 1946, and Mayotte later became a French department in 2011. Specific measures were established to address the remoteness and underdevelopment of those territories, some of which remain in effect today.

Figure 1: The French Overseas Departments. Source : Author's elaboration

Hence, in the 1950s, a wage premium ("sur-rémuneration") was put in place for civil servants across all 3 public services (state civil servants, local civil servants, and hospital workers) and the military to develop the public sector in overseas departments. The measure had three objectives: compensate for the higher cost of living overseas, cover installation costs and other costs derived from the distance from the mainland, and develop job attractiveness to the mainlanders and young native graduates to fill up managers' positions in the public workforce. Including the already higher pay for all public jobs in overseas territories, total benefits now add up to a premium of 40% in the Antilles and French Guiana, and 53% in Reunion. This wage premium is owed to all civil servants, regardless of birthplace.

2.2 Related literature

A common finding in the literature is that the public sector favors low-skilled employees, offering higher minimum pay rates than the private sector, while failing to retain the highest skilled. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) show that this is more pronounced in France among women (especially at the lowest deciles), who are better off in the public sector. Given the sensitivity of the "public-premium" to the choice of quantiles, they use the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition method to decompose the public-private pay gap at each decile and show that observed characteristics account for most (60%) of the pay gap, more so at the highest deciles. The prevalence of the unexplained component to explain the public premium in the lowest deciles reflects how much pay formation is regulated, and how lower-skilled workers

are protected in the French public sector (Meurs and Ponthieux 2004). Furthermore, Bargain and Melly (2008) show that the public premia result from a selection effect based on unobservable characteristics, as women (men) tend to self-select positively (negatively) into the public sector. They cite non-monetary incentives for the attractiveness of the public sector, particularly for women's job protection, but also in-kind benefits like family supplements or gender-specific advantages such as family-friendly policies. Given this interaction between the public-private and gender wage gaps, one can expect that a reinforced competitiveness of the public sector wages across the rest of the distribution could significantly impact the total gender wage gap. In that case, could the women favoring the public sector for its flexibility and other non-monetary benefits really "have it all"? In that regard, the situation of overseas departments appears to be of particular interest.

3   Empirical Strategy

Following Blau and Kahn (2017), Lucifora and Meurs (2006), and Bargain and Melly (2008), I use the Oaxaca-Blinder method (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) to obtain general and detailed decompositions of the mean wage gap. The RIF-Oaxaca method (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 2011), an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder, allows for the decomposition of quantile gaps using unconditional quantile regression introduced in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). I apply this method to decompose the 75th percentile gap.

The Oaxaca-Blinder method first assumes linear wage equations in both the men's (M) and women's (W) groups as follows:

$$Y_g = \beta_g X_g + \epsilon_g; g = M, W$$

In the model, log hourly wage Y for group g is explained by age, socio-professional status (4 categories: executives, intermediate professions, employees, skilled and unskilled workers), sector (public or private), hours worked (full-time or part-time), the size of the enterprise (micro-enterprises, small, medium, and large), with the addition of the level of education (no diploma, high school level, 2-3 year college degree, advanced college degree) available on a reduced dataset, per year, territory, and gender.

For each year and territory, the overall gender wage gaps Δ_O^ν for any distributional statistic ν (the mean or any quantile) is decomposed into explained and unexplained parts as follows:

$$\Delta_O^\nu = \underbrace{\nu(F_{Y_M|D_M}) - \nu(F_{Y_M:X=X|D_W}^C)}_{\Delta_X^\nu} + \underbrace{\nu(F_{Y_M:X=X|D_W}^C) - \nu(F_{Y_W|D_W})}_{\Delta_S^\nu},$$

where $F_{Y_i|D_j}$ is the distribution of wage Y in group i given the characteristics of the individuals in group j, with i,j in $\{M;W\}$. Only $F_{Y_M|D_M}$ and $F_{Y_W|D_W}$ are observed. $F_{Y_M:X=X|D_W}^C$ is the counterfactual distribution of women's wages if their characteristics were valued the same as their male counterparts.

The explained component Δ_X^ν thus stems from a difference in the makeup of the two working populations. It is translated here by a difference in the distribution of covariates in the male and female workforce, which I will characterize as a composition effect. The unexplained component Δ_S^ν arises from the differing returns of those same covariates according to gender (differences in the associated coefficient when the same Mincer regression is applied to the male and female workforce). This remaining part, which can not be explained by a difference in the composition of the population, is traditionally linked to discrimination occurring in the labor market.

The RIF-oaxaca method relies on the use of the Influence Function $IF(y; \nu)$, which measures the influence of a contamination of distribution F_Y at point y on distributional statistic ν. The Recentered Influence Function is defined as $\nu(F_Y) + IF(y, \nu)$ and aggregates back to $\nu(F_Y)$. This property allows for a decomposition analogous to the one previously introduced, when outcome Y is replaced by the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) for the distributional statistic of interest ν in the linear regression.

$$RIF(Y_g; \nu) = \beta_g X_g + \epsilon_g; g = M, W$$

The standard Oaxaca-Blinder method involves estimating separate wage equations for each group and constructing a counterfactual wage distribution by applying the estimated returns of covariates obtained in one group to the other's characteristics. I use instead the reweighting approach of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) in which the original distribution of men's characteristics is reweighted to replicate the distribution of women's, keeping the conditional wage distribution intact. This non-parametric method avoids errors from functional form misspecification, but requires the common support assumption between the two groups. Reweighting errors stemming from a lack of common support are reported in the detailed decompositions of the non-explained component.

For the 75th quantile, I also implement the method of decomposition of Chernozukhov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013), in which the counterfactual distribution is constructed using conditional quantile regression. In this method, the estimated conditional distribution of one group is applied to the characteristics of the other one to form the counterfactual. This method relies on the additional hypothesis of conditional rank preservation, which means that conditionally on its characteristics, a worker would rank the same in both groups, and does not provide a detailed decomposition.

For all the specifications, bootstrapped standard errors and corresponding p-values are computed using the pairs bootstrap method (599 replications)[2] from the estimates of the detailed decompositions. Finally, I allow for heterogeneous effects by repeating the main analysis across each type of public service (state, local, and hospital).

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[2]51 replications are used when implementing the Chernozukhov method of decomposition as it is computationally intensive.

4 Data and descriptive evidence

4.1 Data and sample selection

I use the Permanent Demographic Sample (EDP) to assess the evolution and dynamics of the gender wage gap in four overseas departments (Reunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana[3]) compared to mainland France, divided into the Paris region and the rest of the country (so-called Provincial France) from 2002 to 2018. The EDP is a panel dataset that follows a sample of individuals and includes the French overseas departments since 2002, covering 1/12th of the population each year. EDP individuals are selected based on their date of birth (2nd to 5th of January, 1st to 4th of April, 1st to 4th of July, and 1st to 4th of October). The EDP draws from 5 sources: civil registers, census information, electoral registers, tax data, and employer-employee linked data, or the so-called DADS Panel.

The DADS Panel provides data from the comprehensive Annual Declaration of Social Data for a sample of individuals selected by date of birth. From 2002 to 2011, only workers born in October were selected. Starting in 2012, workers born either in October in an even year or on an EDP day of every year were selected. This disruption in the sampling method of the exhaustive DADS Panel leads to an over-representation of individuals born in even years in the 2017 panel, which is addressed by using only EDP individuals.

The DADS Panel, matched with the EDP, provides a larger sample of individuals in overseas departments from 2002 to 2018 than the traditionally used French Labour Force surveys (which only include overseas departments from 2014 onward). It also offers greater accuracy, given the administrative nature of its sources, and serves as a solution to the under-reporting of jobs in the survey (Picart 2019).

Our initial sample includes workers aged 25-65 from the public and private sectors, excluding the agricultural sector. I am not concerned with the self-employed, as their hourly earnings are not available, and further exclude apprentices, interns, and people working for the clergy. I follow the DADS definition of a "non-annex" period of employment and limit the annual hours worked to 120 to 2500. Following Kramarz, Nimier-David, and Delemotte (2022), I impose a minimum annual earnings threshold equivalent to 260 hours at the minimum wage (approximately a part-time job for a quarter). Doing so, I obtain sample sizes ranging from 733 observations in 2003 in French Guiana to 688,776 observations in 2012 in Provincial France.

The civil servants working for the state are only included in the DADS Panel starting in 2009, whereas civil servants working in hospitals and local governments are present throughout the whole period of study. This change in the makeup of the sample does affect the evolution of labor earnings observed between 2008 and 2009 in the overseas department, mitigating the effect of the 2008 crisis. To account for this pure composition effect, I study the two periods, before 2009 and after, distinctly.

Tables 1 and 2 provide sample sizes and summary statistics for worker characteristics, including age, sector of employment (public or private), socio-professional category, and workplace

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[3]Mayotte is excluded due to a lack of data.

size, based on the main database for men and women, respectively. They show that in the public sector, men are more likely to be skilled and unskilled workers, while women mostly occupy employee-level to intermediate professions positions. Women remain consistently underrepresented in executive roles in the public sector. In 2018, 8.65 % of women occupied such a position in Provincial France, while it is 15% for men. The gap is less important overseas, where it varies from a difference of less than one percentage point in Reunion and Guadeloupe to 2.5 percentage points in French Guiana in 2018. Women are also more likely to work part-time, with a share of 26.75% in Reunion in 2018, compared to 12.71% for men. The difference overseas is, however, less pronounced than in Provincial France, where 30.46% of women and 8.82% of men work part-time.

To obtain educational levels, employer-employee linked data from year t is matched with census data spanning seven years (t-3 to t+3). The Annual Census Survey (ACS) covers 1/5 of towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and 8% of residences in towns with 10,000 or more inhabitants each year. This method allows me to match between 45% and 52% of workers per year, starting in 2010. Tables 3 and 4 present summary statistics from the census-matched database for men and women, respectively, and show that the share of higher-educated individuals is consistently higher in the women's group compared with the men's. The share of women who have completed 2 to 3 years of college has especially been rising in Reunion, from 23.31 % in 2010 to 31.24 % in 2018.

Total annual earnings are given as the sum of net labor earnings (including overtime hours but excluding workers' mandatory social contributions) across all jobs in a given year. Since 2013, net earnings have also included employers' contributions to compulsory complementary health insurance (CPSO), engendering a small series disruption [4]. Net earnings are expressed in 2018 euros using the Consumer Price Index series computed by INSEE for each of the territories of interest (one series per overseas department and one for mainland France). Hourly wages are computed by dividing total annual earnings by the number of hours worked.

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[4]It does not affect comparisons between territories and only marginally affects comparisons over time.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Men (Main sample)

Year	N	Age (mean)	Public Worker (%)	Public Employee (%)	Public Intermediate Prof. (%)	Public Executive (%)	Private Worker (%)	Private Employee (%)	Private Intermediate Prof. (%)	Private Executive (%)	Part-time (%)	Microenterprises (%)	Small and medium enterprises (%)	Intermediate enterprises (%)	Large enterprises (%)
Provincial France															
2002	307332	40.61	48.60	9.43	20.76	12.31	1.24	4.02	2.28	1.35	10.77	13.83	40.45	32.64	13.08
2009	350782	41.70	43.27	11.00	17.59	12.42	1.54	6.80	3.46	3.93	9.43	13.06	40.24	33.83	12.87
2010	358445	41.85	41.91	10.86	17.65	12.75	1.77	7.02	3.83	4.21	10.11	13.15	40.08	34.14	12.63
2018	374535	42.75	40.66	11.58	16.75	15.00	4.57	3.59	3.88	3.97	8.82	12.02	41.55	31.76	14.67
Paris region															
2002	84963	40.26	28.37	12.40	22.02	30.02	1.07	2.97	1.95	1.22	11.13	13.64	34.80	32.11	19.46
2009	100311	41.16	25.92	14.91	16.40	27.50	0.85	6.56	3.10	4.76	10.32	12.73	33.70	33.04	20.54
2010	100330	41.19	25.16	14.95	16.66	28.21	0.95	6.30	3.04	4.73	11.34	13.02	33.43	33.39	20.16
2018	107381	42.03	24.93	16.03	14.23	31.05	2.77	3.76	3.05	4.18	9.68	12.65	34.95	32.58	19.83
Guadeloupe															
2002	1470	40.81	37.96	16.67	16.67	9.73	3.27	10.27	2.99	2.45	14.49	21.29	46.94	24.35	7.14
2009	2081	43.64	33.30	15.43	11.48	7.54	2.07	16.29	7.40	6.49	10.19	19.70	46.08	27.92	6.15
2010	2145	43.74	32.45	15.85	12.40	7.46	1.86	15.57	8.07	6.34	11.19	19.81	47.88	26.15	6.01
2018	2107	45.58	31.47	18.22	12.10	7.36	9.73	8.40	7.17	5.55	9.49	20.46	48.27	26.39	4.89
Martinique															
2002	1750	40.61	38.74	14.17	15.77	9.66	3.60	10.69	4.86	2.51	14.17	21.54	47.14	25.77	5.49
2009	2259	43.86	34.88	16.47	11.38	7.08	1.86	15.14	8.32	4.87	9.78	18.19	49.85	27.71	3.90
2010	2170	44.52	34.33	17.00	10.74	8.02	1.98	14.24	8.85	4.84	9.26	19.45	49.45	26.64	4.06
2018	2138	45.65	34.80	18.76	12.02	6.59	8.56	7.30	7.44	4.54	9.26	19.22	52.15	21.75	6.83
French Guiana															
2002	523	40.39	41.87	13.19	15.68	15.49	0.00	6.69	2.68	2.29	12.24	23.71	49.71	19.31	7.27
2009	950	42.47	31.05	10.84	11.26	7.58	2.32	17.05	10.53	9.37	6.74	14.53	51.79	28.84	4.53
2010	1011	42.18	32.84	10.88	12.46	7.62	1.98	15.73	9.99	8.51	9.20	16.02	53.71	25.32	4.35
2018	1235	43.23	33.28	12.06	10.61	7.45	7.04	10.36	12.39	6.80	8.42	14.98	52.79	27.45	4.78
Reunion															
2002	3149	38.53	43.16	14.83	15.34	7.59	1.75	12.00	2.99	2.35	14.77	22.61	43.51	30.07	3.78
2009	4759	40.90	36.88	15.15	11.75	6.01	1.24	15.89	7.27	5.82	11.47	18.76	44.65	33.10	3.30
2010	4827	41.09	34.72	15.25	12.29	6.05	1.08	17.22	7.29	6.11	12.93	17.92	45.58	32.84	3.65
2018	5404	42.80	35.66	16.77	10.44	6.51	7.98	9.42	7.44	5.79	12.71	16.25	46.85	30.27	6.62

Note:

Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Women (Main sample)

Year	N	Age (mean)	Public Worker (%)	Public Employee (%)	Public Intermediate Prof. (%)	Public Executive (%)	Private Worker (%)	Private Employee (%)	Private Intermediate Prof. (%)	Private Executive (%)	Part-time (%)	Microenterprises (%)	Small and medium enterprises (%)	Intermediate enterprises (%)	Large enterprises (%)
Provincial France															
2002	235970	40.46	15.38	38.17	18.75	5.34	0.31	13.91	6.74	1.40	33.89	14.82	38.10	35.19	11.90
2009	311751	41.98	10.98	35.64	14.88	6.49	0.59	15.63	10.66	5.13	31.88	12.22	39.68	35.85	12.26
2010	324098	42.12	10.44	35.25	14.57	6.19	0.64	16.14	11.33	5.44	32.59	12.01	39.75	36.01	12.24
2018	299576	45.94	10.53	30.99	14.94	8.65	3.50	13.00	12.93	5.46	30.46	10.84	39.26	36.36	13.55
Paris region															
2002	71094	39.96	7.46	31.41	25.02	18.33	0.17	10.10	5.69	1.83	22.77	11.96	31.76	37.62	18.65
2009	92060	41.26	6.03	28.99	16.51	19.10	0.38	12.38	9.99	6.63	22.25	10.04	32.24	38.79	18.93
2010	92532	41.29	5.97	29.22	16.69	19.08	0.45	12.43	9.75	6.41	23.25	10.12	31.39	39.32	19.17
2018	80757	45.35	6.21	25.04	14.85	23.80	2.81	10.12	10.86	6.31	20.58	9.18	29.91	41.25	19.65
Guadeloupe															
2002	1534	40.66	6.58	41.72	17.14	3.78	0.00	21.25	7.50	1.83	24.05	19.23	43.35	33.57	3.39
2009	2323	43.15	4.86	32.93	11.80	4.65	0.00	23.59	14.85	7.02	21.18	14.08	43.95	38.57	3.14
2010	2393	43.39	3.80	34.27	11.83	4.76	0.00	23.15	14.54	7.27	22.11	14.04	46.01	36.23	3.43
2018	2315	47.69	4.32	31.36	11.06	6.39	5.87	17.41	17.19	6.39	20.69	15.46	43.02	37.75	3.63
Martinique															
2002	1818	40.55	7.04	34.65	16.89	4.35	1.49	20.74	12.82	2.04	28.16	17.93	38.89	39.49	3.25
2009	2494	43.62	5.25	31.56	11.83	4.97	0.80	23.54	15.44	6.62	19.57	14.92	44.75	37.13	2.73
2010	2491	44.12	4.90	33.72	11.24	5.22	0.84	22.24	15.42	6.42	20.55	16.14	44.84	35.49	3.37
2018	2237	48.23	5.05	30.84	12.52	5.41	5.50	17.43	16.99	6.26	18.02	14.66	45.42	28.74	10.86
French Guiana															
2002	384	39.55	5.99	38.54	16.93	7.03	0.00	24.48	4.69	0.00	18.23	18.75	44.79	29.17	7.29
2009	847	40.97	5.08	21.84	12.16	4.72	0.00	29.28	19.01	7.56	11.92	11.57	40.02	42.03	5.08
2010	924	41.39	4.00	24.57	12.01	5.30	0.00	28.68	17.86	7.03	16.77	12.99	41.02	40.80	4.22
2018	1011	45.05	4.35	22.35	10.39	4.95	7.42	18.40	24.73	7.42	18.10	10.39	38.77	46.49	4.15
Reunion															
2002	2034	39.08	5.56	38.00	17.75	4.13	1.92	23.99	6.59	2.06	28.32	17.11	30.38	49.21	3.24
2009	3578	40.86	4.84	28.65	12.38	4.02	0.00	26.80	16.15	6.88	24.68	12.77	34.82	48.97	3.44
2010	3846	40.77	4.13	29.82	11.96	3.87	0.00	29.04	14.30	6.63	28.68	12.95	35.57	47.97	3.38
2018	3967	45.31	4.66	28.96	11.42	5.55	4.26	19.96	18.35	6.83	26.75	12.10	35.64	40.13	12.10

Note:

Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Men (Census-matched sample)

Year	N	Age (mean)	Public Worker (%)	Public Employee (%)	Public Intermediate Prof. (%)	Public Executive (%)	Private Worker (%)	Private Employee (%)	Private Intermediate Prof. (%)	Private Executive (%)	Part-time (%)	Microenterprises (%)	Small and medium enterprises (%)	Intermediate enterprises (%)	Large enterprises (%)	No diploma	High School	2-3 year college	Advanced college
Provincial France																			
2010	253646	42.31	42.57	9.71	18.34	12.51	1.88	7.20	3.90	3.88	9.13	12.58	41.15	33.93	12.33	19.30	41.60	25.75	13.35
2012	264128	42.58	42.72	10.08	17.40	13.02	4.95	4.10	3.82	3.92	10.49	12.67	40.58	34.67	12.08	18.21	41.35	26.70	13.73
2014	263078	42.95	41.84	10.41	17.19	13.42	5.29	3.96	3.96	3.94	10.33	12.72	40.57	34.62	12.10	16.59	45.10	25.70	12.61
2016	257902	43.03	41.74	10.38	17.28	13.72	5.10	3.95	3.88	3.94	8.21	11.48	42.24	32.83	13.45	15.02	49.52	24.10	11.36
2018	252442	43.44	41.05	10.31	17.62	14.73	5.03	3.64	3.96	3.66	8.00	11.62	42.12	32.15	14.11	13.69	52.43	23.30	10.58
Paris region																			
2010	46132	41.72	23.84	13.31	18.18	28.74	1.10	6.80	3.31	4.73	10.01	11.33	33.10	34.01	21.57	19.25	28.95	23.40	28.39
2012	49605	41.91	24.62	13.56	16.42	29.65	3.22	4.79	3.06	4.67	11.86	11.47	32.55	34.68	21.30	18.71	28.79	23.88	28.62
2014	49045	42.16	24.39	14.20	16.24	29.44	3.26	4.57	3.20	4.70	11.84	11.67	32.98	34.54	20.81	17.46	31.11	24.39	27.04
2016	48842	42.24	23.71	14.76	15.70	30.33	3.08	4.68	3.10	4.64	8.32	11.13	34.12	34.26	20.49	16.25	33.66	24.19	25.90
2018	45800	42.61	23.02	14.34	15.87	31.71	3.00	4.35	3.37	4.34	8.45	10.70	34.34	33.48	21.48	14.81	35.50	24.38	25.31
Guadeloupe																			
2010	902	44.41	32.59	15.41	10.98	6.98	1.44	16.74	8.76	7.10	12.64	20.18	49.00	24.72	5.21	29.82	37.14	19.07	13.97
2012	1002	44.66	32.73	15.37	11.48	7.49	9.58	9.18	8.08	6.09	13.17	20.96	47.70	25.55	4.79	28.34	37.62	20.46	13.57
2014	1003	45.14	30.61	15.55	11.86	6.98	9.87	9.77	8.77	6.58	13.66	20.24	44.57	29.21	5.78	23.93	42.57	20.94	12.56
2016	1015	45.55	29.75	17.44	12.02	5.62	10.05	11.63	7.59	5.91	12.51	18.52	48.28	29.46	2.96	22.86	46.21	22.07	8.87
2018	914	46.28	31.95	17.18	11.27	7.11	9.74	9.63	7.77	5.36	8.75	20.24	48.25	26.48	4.05	20.13	51.31	20.46	8.10
Martinique																			
2010	1010	44.64	32.87	17.03	11.29	8.32	2.08	13.96	9.70	4.75	9.41	18.71	50.00	25.45	5.25	29.50	36.83	19.60	14.06
2012	1074	45.29	34.73	15.27	12.29	7.91	8.19	8.10	8.29	5.21	11.45	21.23	47.39	25.61	5.12	28.68	37.71	20.58	13.04
2014	1075	45.72	33.49	14.14	11.16	8.47	8.93	8.84	9.49	5.49	10.98	19.53	47.35	24.47	8.56	26.05	38.42	22.79	12.74
2016	1063	45.48	31.89	18.91	10.63	7.34	9.31	8.65	8.00	5.27	11.67	19.00	48.92	25.68	6.40	23.33	44.21	23.14	9.31
2018	976	46.08	32.27	17.52	12.50	7.68	9.53	8.20	7.79	4.51	8.50	18.14	51.84	22.34	7.68	20.29	48.57	22.95	8.20
French Guiana																			
2010	436	42.36	30.50	8.94	14.45	7.57	0.00	18.12	10.55	8.03	8.72	14.22	54.13	26.38	4.13	28.44	37.39	17.43	16.74
2012	524	42.17	34.35	9.73	12.02	6.87	7.63	11.83	9.92	7.63	14.12	16.60	53.44	25.95	3.05	33.78	33.21	18.13	14.89
2014	526	42.60	30.80	11.22	11.60	7.41	11.98	9.13	11.79	6.08	13.31	18.06	49.05	28.52	3.80	31.75	34.79	20.72	12.74
2016	559	42.50	31.48	9.48	10.55	7.51	11.81	9.48	11.81	7.87	10.20	13.95	53.85	29.34	2.33	30.59	34.53	22.18	12.70
2018	486	43.10	30.45	8.64	10.70	9.26	9.26	10.91	12.96	7.82	10.08	13.17	53.70	28.60	4.12	28.19	36.21	22.63	12.96
Reunion																			
2010	1972	41.38	34.23	14.15	12.17	5.58	1.27	17.60	7.71	7.30	12.27	17.44	45.44	33.37	3.45	34.99	31.29	18.00	15.72
2012	2121	42.08	34.79	14.14	12.68	6.08	7.17	10.70	7.21	7.21	14.24	18.20	44.74	30.22	6.74	34.23	32.11	18.10	15.56
2014	2239	42.49	33.45	15.27	11.17	6.03	8.93	11.26	6.97	6.92	14.60	18.31	42.52	32.51	6.65	32.60	34.97	20.41	12.01
2016	2209	43.10	33.86	15.39	11.32	5.25	8.78	11.00	6.93	7.47	14.12	16.43	44.50	33.23	5.75	28.56	39.97	20.73	10.73
2018	1968	43.30	35.47	15.65	10.42	5.69	9.50	9.60	7.52	6.15	12.91	15.45	46.70	31.86	6.00	25.41	45.33	21.54	7.72

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Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Women (Census-matched sample)

Year	N	Age (mean)	Public Worker (%)	Public Employee (%)	Public Intermediate Prof. (%)	Public Executive (%)	Private Worker (%)	Private Employee (%)	Private Intermediate Prof. (%)	Private Executive (%)	Part-time (%)	Microenterprises (%)	Small and medium enterprises (%)	Intermediate enterprises (%)	Large enterprises (%)	No diploma	High School	2-3 year college	Advanced college
Provincial France																			
2010	234307	42.31	10.62	35.24	14.45	5.73	0.65	16.72	11.63	4.96	33.30	12.10	41.18	35.21	11.51	16.83	33.61	33.17	16.39
2012	246784	42.61	11.05	34.85	13.91	6.37	3.15	13.93	11.81	4.94	34.18	12.01	40.53	35.85	11.61	15.27	33.52	34.30	16.90
2014	240566	43.77	10.45	33.71	13.90	6.75	3.52	14.13	12.41	5.13	33.73	11.53	40.27	36.54	11.66	13.84	37.26	34.37	14.54
2016	227996	44.81	10.43	32.02	14.73	7.12	3.59	14.32	12.52	5.27	31.74	11.15	40.50	35.98	12.37	12.43	41.51	34.11	11.94
2018	213209	45.99	10.43	30.90	15.14	7.95	3.65	13.62	13.33	4.98	31.00	10.94	40.53	35.80	12.74	11.20	44.36	34.15	10.29
Paris region																			
2010	43889	41.54	5.09	28.67	17.60	18.15	0.49	12.98	10.67	6.36	23.07	9.57	31.76	39.55	19.13	15.27	26.19	29.92	28.62
2012	46870	41.76	5.15	28.68	15.91	19.62	2.56	11.36	10.46	6.26	24.19	9.59	30.44	40.56	19.40	14.43	25.57	30.56	29.44
2014	44439	42.96	5.00	27.60	15.30	20.32	2.78	11.06	11.41	6.53	23.53	9.36	29.99	40.96	19.68	13.37	27.82	31.70	27.11
2016	41609	44.19	5.21	26.00	15.58	21.33	2.82	11.40	11.06	6.59	20.56	8.82	30.43	41.91	18.84	12.45	30.59	32.94	24.02
2018	36448	45.50	5.25	24.46	15.94	22.65	2.87	10.64	11.93	6.27	20.17	8.63	30.11	41.45	19.81	11.34	32.73	34.25	21.68
Guadeloupe																			
2010	1114	43.74	3.86	31.69	11.76	4.58	0.00	25.67	15.26	6.91	23.88	13.46	46.14	36.89	2.33	21.90	34.29	26.30	17.50
2012	1225	44.28	4.49	31.84	10.94	4.98	5.80	19.18	15.76	7.02	25.80	16.65	44.16	35.59	3.10	20.49	35.43	26.69	17.39
2014	1173	45.53	3.92	29.41	10.49	5.63	6.91	19.61	16.97	7.08	24.30	14.75	43.31	38.45	2.13	16.88	38.11	29.24	15.77
2016	1129	46.72	4.69	31.00	10.36	4.34	6.64	20.90	16.12	5.93	22.59	15.32	41.98	39.68	1.59	16.92	40.48	30.29	12.31
2018	1037	48.02	4.63	30.76	10.41	5.30	6.56	20.25	17.36	4.73	22.57	14.37	44.84	36.93	2.70	16.10	43.20	30.95	9.74
Martinique																			
2010	1238	44.01	4.68	33.12	11.47	4.60	0.00	23.10	16.16	6.30	21.73	16.96	46.77	32.96	2.50	21.89	32.55	27.14	18.42
2012	1320	44.90	5.98	33.33	11.29	4.70	5.45	18.33	14.62	6.29	21.36	16.89	45.45	33.48	2.95	19.62	35.30	28.33	16.74
2014	1287	46.26	4.97	32.01	10.88	5.13	5.75	17.25	17.64	6.37	21.91	16.01	44.83	28.75	10.18	18.80	36.75	28.90	15.54
2016	1225	47.40	4.82	31.43	11.10	5.47	5.06	18.94	16.24	6.94	19.67	16.08	46.94	27.43	9.31	17.22	39.02	29.55	14.20
2018	1060	48.46	5.09	31.04	13.30	5.38	5.09	17.83	16.42	5.85	19.72	14.81	48.30	26.13	10.28	14.91	42.55	30.66	11.89
French Guiana																			
2010	427	41.09	3.75	22.72	13.82	2.81	0.00	31.38	19.91	5.39	15.93	10.30	39.81	43.56	5.15	22.72	35.60	24.12	17.56
2012	445	42.04	3.37	24.04	11.24	3.15	7.19	22.70	22.02	6.29	19.33	11.46	38.43	44.49	4.49	22.92	33.48	25.84	17.75
2014	514	42.43	4.47	21.21	11.09	3.11	11.09	19.26	23.15	6.61	24.51	11.09	38.52	45.91	3.50	22.37	33.66	26.85	17.12
2016	459	43.93	2.61	23.53	10.02	3.70	8.28	21.13	22.00	8.71	16.78	10.68	40.31	44.88	3.27	20.92	34.42	28.10	16.56
2018	397	44.64	0.00	22.17	8.31	6.05	7.81	18.89	26.70	7.56	15.11	8.82	39.80	48.11	0.00	21.66	36.78	25.94	15.62
Reunion																			
2010	1617	40.98	4.08	28.88	11.69	3.65	0.00	30.55	14.66	6.18	29.13	12.18	34.76	49.66	3.15	27.52	30.18	23.31	18.99
2012	1856	41.36	5.33	28.61	11.85	3.77	4.42	23.38	16.70	5.93	30.28	13.25	33.03	41.27	12.28	25.22	29.90	26.67	18.21
2014	1847	42.90	4.87	28.64	10.94	4.66	4.93	22.52	17.43	6.01	30.21	12.40	33.08	41.58	12.83	24.20	32.86	27.34	15.59
2016	1764	44.00	5.78	28.06	10.09	4.20	4.82	22.51	18.48	6.07	28.51	11.68	32.14	43.20	12.93	22.79	36.28	29.88	11.05
2018	1530	45.08	4.51	28.63	10.20	4.77	3.79	20.13	20.52	7.45	26.34	11.83	35.03	40.59	12.55	18.37	39.74	31.24	10.65

4.2   The overseas public wage premium

Figure 2 shows the public-private pay gap in hourly wages. The public-private gap is computed as the value in the public sector minus the corresponding value in the private sector. As private sector wages are relatively comparable between regions, the premium public wage leads to significant positive wage gaps overseas, while they are negative on the continent. The disparity only increases as we move up the distribution, with a differential of more than 4 euros per hour in favor of women at the 75th percentile for Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, and 6.54 euros per hour in Reunion in 2018. The overseas public wage premium thus appears at the higher deciles (median, mean, and above). Table 5 displays mean differences for selected years and shows a significant public-private gap varying overseas between 3.238 euros in French Guiana and 4.558 euros in Reunion, compared to 0.3 euros in Provincial France, and a negative gap of -4.021 euros in the Paris region in 2018.

Over the last 16 years, women have remained underrepresented in the top decile of wages in mainland France, as shown in Figure 3. Although their share in the first and second deciles, which was more than 60% in 2002 in Provincial France, has decreased over the years in favor of the third and fourth deciles, they make up less than 35% of the top decile in 2018. Overseas, women were also prevalent in the lowest deciles at the beginning of the period. However, they represent a growing majority at other parts of the distribution, much higher up. In 2002, working women already made more than 50% of the 8th and 9th deciles in Guadeloupe and Martinique. This is true of French Guiana's 6th and 7th deciles. In Reunion, working women make up most of the 9th decile starting in 2009. The growth in the share of women in those respective upper deciles is not reflected in the mainland. The glass ceiling, however, shows little movement as the share of women still plummets in the 10th decile everywhere.

The unconditional gender wage gap, computed as the value for men minus the corresponding value for women, has been declining nationwide in France, as shown in Figure 4. On average and at most percentiles, earnings remain higher for men than for women in mainland France. In Provincial France, the decline is much slower, and the region remains the one with the highest levels of gender inequality. In overseas departments, the gap was much lower to begin with. In Martinique, the wage gap has been negative since 2016 for the mean, and along with Guadeloupe and French Guiana, since 2010 for the median. In Reunion, the mean and median gaps became negative in 2018, but the 75th percentile gap has been negative for most of the study period.

Table 6 reports the mean gender wage gap for selected years and reveals significant gaps of 1.905 and 2.451 euros per hour in Provincial France and the Paris region, respectively. The gap is also significant, but negative in Reunion (-0.425 euros per hour) and non-significant in Martinique and French Guiana.

The remaining wage disparity benefiting men is higher at the top, as the 90th percentile wage gap is the least reduced at the end of the period, except in Reunion. Differences in the ranking of the gaps between percentiles can be noted. In mainland France, the gap increases as we move up. We see a higher gender wage gap at the 90th percentile but a lower or negative gap at the 10th percentile. In Reunion and Martinique, the reduction and reversal

of the gender wage gaps occur primarily around the middle and upper half of the distribution at the mean, median, and 75th percentile as opposed to the 10th and 25th percentile.

This "women-premium" does not exist among all age groups, professions, and sectors, as gender inequality benefiting men is still very much a reality, even in overseas departments. The "women-premium" is first prevalent among 25- to 34-year-olds, where the mean and median hourly wage gaps became negative in most overseas departments from 2009 onward, as seen in Figure 17 in Appendix 1. The close-to-0 or negative gap documented earlier appears only in the intermediate professions and employee categories (see Figure 18 in Appendix 1).

Figure 19 in Appendix 1 shows that on the continent, gender wage gaps at every percentile are consistently lower in the public sector than in the private sector, as both decrease over time. The opposite is true overseas. Across all 4 departments, I observe lower gender wage gaps in the private sector. The contrast is most striking in Reunion and Martinique, where wage gaps at all deciles and the mean are consistently close to 0 over the whole period in the private sector, but close to Provincial France levels in the public sector.

Occupational gender differences, as shown in Figure 5, persist overseas as well. Women make up the majority of employees and the intermediate-profession workforce everywhere except the Paris region, and they make up more than 50% of executive-level professions only in Guadeloupe and Martinique. Figure 6 shows, as expected, that women are over-represented in the public sector everywhere, reaching 67% in French Guiana.

There is also a divide between women who are natives from the overseas departments and non-natives (mostly from the mainland) [5]. Women native to Reunion, Guadeloupe, and Martinique make up around 50% of the lowest deciles of their respective regions, as shown in Figure 7. However, this share decreases sharply in the top 3 deciles, and in 2018 they make up less than 20% of the top decile in Reunion.

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[5]I refer to "native" as individuals who were born in the region of interest. Therefore non-natives in one of the overseas departments can come from Mainland France, other overseas departments, or from outside of the country.

Figure 2: Public-private pay gap (hourly wages). Data set: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Table 5: Hourly wages across sectors

| | | *Private* | | | *Public* | | | *Difference (Public - Private)* | | |
Year	N	Mean	(S.D.)	N	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean gap[a]	T-stat	P-value	Normalized difference[b]
Provincial France										
2002	463209	12.953	6.959	80093	13.779	6.129	0.826***	-34.481	0.000	-0.126
2009	507596	13.500	7.173	154937	15.096	7.579	1.596***	-73.463	0.000	-0.216
2010	513492	13.470	8.338	169051	14.903	6.664	1.433***	-71.812	0.000	-0.190
2018	509623	14.525	10.607	164488	14.833	6.772	0.309***	-13.805	0.000	-0.035
Paris region										
2002	137299	17.868	17.824	18758	14.406	7.130	-3.462***	48.847	0.000	0.255
2009	150014	18.117	16.124	42357	16.510	8.013	-1.607***	28.198	0.000	0.126
2010	150914	18.206	19.409	41948	16.379	8.059	-1.827***	28.729	0.000	0.123
2018	149071	20.300	23.310	39067	16.279	7.917	-4.021***	55.500	0.000	0.231
Guadeloupe										
2002	2253	12.832	7.374	751	15.009	6.689	2.177***	-7.525	0.000	-0.309
2009	2670	13.884	7.647	1734	19.113	8.766	5.228***	-20.318	0.000	-0.636
2010	2770	13.606	7.332	1768	18.507	7.738	4.901***	-21.232	0.000	-0.650
2018	2687	14.705	8.828	1735	18.688	8.697	3.983***	-14.782	0.000	-0.455
Martinique										
2002	2515	12.938	7.438	1053	14.337	7.510	1.399***	-5.091	0.000	-0.187
2009	2914	13.830	9.569	1839	18.241	9.362	4.410***	-15.684	0.000	-0.466
2010	2893	13.715	9.045	1768	18.329	10.710	4.614***	-15.118	0.000	-0.466
2018	2747	14.107	8.389	1628	18.466	8.344	4.358***	-16.667	0.000	-0.521
French Guiana										
2002	714	14.335	9.144	193	14.846	6.791	0.511	-0.856	0.393	-0.063
2009	948	14.280	8.367	849	18.534	10.269	4.254***	-9.560	0.000	-0.454
2010	1069	14.158	7.963	866	17.947	8.729	3.789***	-9.872	0.000	-0.454
2018	1208	14.786	9.200	1038	18.069	7.879	3.283***	-9.110	0.000	-0.383
Reunion										
2002	3879	12.227	7.049	1304	13.972	9.086	1.744***	-6.322	0.000	-0.215
2009	5106	13.033	6.694	3231	17.764	10.033	4.731***	-23.678	0.000	-0.555
2010	5212	12.961	6.614	3461	17.338	9.906	4.378***	-22.837	0.000	-0.520
2018	5756	13.509	7.617	3615	18.067	9.542	4.558***	-24.272	0.000	-0.528

[a] Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.

[b] Normalized differences equal to the difference in means divided by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances are reported for a scale-free measure of the differences (Imbens and Rubin 2015). As a rule of thumb, normalized differences higher than 0.25 in absolute value indicate a significant difference in means.

Figure 3: Evolution of the share of women per decile of earnings (annual wages). Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Figure 4: Gender pay gap (hourly wages). Data set: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Table 6: Hourly wages across genders

		Men			Women			Difference (Men - Women)		
Year	N	Mean	(S.D.)	N	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean gap[a]	T-stat	P-value	Normalized difference[b]
Provincial France										
2002	307332	14.126	7.876	235970	11.705	4.891	2.422***	139.071	0.000	0.369
2009	350782	14.908	8.337	311751	12.709	5.702	2.199***	126.456	0.000	0.308
2010	358445	14.870	9.505	324098	12.668	5.624	2.202***	117.763	0.000	0.282
2018	374535	15.447	11.653	299576	13.542	6.694	1.905***	84.191	0.000	0.200
Paris region										
2002	84963	19.283	20.195	71094	15.263	11.556	4.020***	49.193	0.000	0.244
2009	100311	19.351	18.194	92060	16.033	9.365	3.318***	50.877	0.000	0.229
2010	100330	19.411	21.895	92532	16.070	10.929	3.341***	42.890	0.000	0.193
2018	107381	20.517	25.021	80757	18.066	14.270	2.451***	26.819	0.000	0.120
Guadeloupe										
2002	1470	14.144	8.234	1534	12.641	6.119	1.504***	5.662	0.000	0.207
2009	2081	16.460	9.378	2323	15.479	7.597	0.981***	3.786	0.000	0.115
2010	2145	16.064	8.825	2393	15.024	6.855	1.040***	4.397	0.000	0.132
2018	2107	16.611	9.949	2315	15.956	8.006	0.654*	2.395	0.017	0.072
Martinique										
2002	1750	14.092	8.452	1818	12.638	6.340	1.453***	5.793	0.000	0.195
2009	2259	15.948	10.762	2494	15.164	8.672	0.784**	2.747	0.006	0.080
2010	2170	15.894	10.131	2491	15.091	9.802	0.803**	2.741	0.006	0.081
2018	2138	15.566	9.343	2237	15.885	7.892	-0.319	-1.216	0.224	-0.037
French Guiana										
2002	523	15.267	10.206	384	13.324	5.891	1.943***	3.611	0.000	0.233
2009	950	17.018	10.419	847	15.472	8.401	1.546***	3.478	0.001	0.163
2010	1011	16.407	9.296	924	15.248	7.547	1.159**	3.021	0.003	0.137
2018	1235	16.402	9.544	1011	16.182	7.716	0.220	0.603	0.546	0.025
Reunion										
2002	3149	12.865	8.324	2034	12.358	6.457	0.507*	2.461	0.014	0.068
2009	4759	14.968	8.806	3578	14.731	8.002	0.237	1.283	0.200	0.028
2010	4827	14.973	8.827	3846	14.375	7.743	0.598***	3.356	0.001	0.072
2018	5404	15.088	9.177	3967	15.512	7.997	-0.425*	-2.385	0.017	-0.049

[a] Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.

[b] Normalized differences equal to the difference in means divided by the square root of the average of the two within-group variances are reported for a scale-free measure of the differences (Imbens and Rubin 2015). As a rule of thumb, normalized differences higher than 0.25 in absolute value indicate a significant difference in means.

Figure 5: Share of female workers across socio-professional status. Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations.


Figure 6: Share of female workers across sectors. Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations.

Figure 7: Evolution of the share of natives among women per decile of earnings (hourly wages). Data: EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

5 Results

Figure 8 shows the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the mean wage gap per year and territory. Each year, the overall wage gap, represented by squares, equals the sum of the explained component (shown as diamonds) and the unexplained component (represented as triangles).

I observe stark differences between territories, setting the overseas departments apart from the mainland. Indeed, the positive wage gap in the Paris region and Provincial France is mainly attributable to the unexplained component, suggesting that women's and men's characteristics are valued differently in a way that profits men. For instance, in 2018 for Provincial France, the explained part is equal to 0.004, and the unexplained part is 0.09 for a total gap of 0.094. Also, both the explained and unexplained parts contribute positively to increasing the wage gap, up until 2016 in the Paris region. As commonly found in the literature, the decrease in the overall gap is attributed to a decrease in the composition effect benefiting men. Overseas, the unexplained component remains positive and significant, but a negative explained component increasingly weighs down the total gap, causing it to get close to 0 or become negative. In 2018, in Reunion, the total gap of -0.039 is thus decomposed into an explained part of -0.086 and a positive unexplained component of 0.047.

In Figure 9, the level of education is added as a regressor using the census-matched database. Results are similar in the significance and values of the explained and unexplained components.

The conclusion is twofold: On the one hand, in all regions, I observe a difference in the ways that workers' attributes contribute to their salary, benefiting men. On the other hand, the differences in the composition of the workforce further profited men in Mainland France and the Paris region (up to 2010 in Provincial France and 2014 in the Paris region), but did the opposite overseas.

The same phenomenon occurs when decomposing the 75th-percentile wage gap, which is shown in Figure 10 for the main sample. Again, while decreasing over time, the gap is mostly positively enforced by the unexplained component in the mainland. There is an unexplained part of 0.129 for a total gap of 0.104 in Provincial France in 2018, and of 0.10 for a total gap of 0.09 in the Paris region. Overseas, the 75th percentile gap is significantly negative over the most recent years, mainly due to a growing composition effect. A striking example is the case of Reunion, where the total gap of -0.11 in 2018 is mainly attributed to a composition effect of -0.18. Figure 11 for the census-matched sample conveys the same results.

The results of the detailed decomposition of the mean and third quartile in all regions in 2018 are reported in Table 7 for the main sample. Starting in 2009, the covariate contributing the most to the composition effect is the occupancy of an intermediate profession in the public sector overseas, reducing the total gap. For instance, in Reunion, the part associated with this covariate is equal to -0.057 for a composition effect of -0.086 at the mean, and -0.127 for a composition effect of -0.18 at the 75th percentile. For the mainland, the main driver of the composition effect is the occupancy of an executive position in the private sector (increasing the total gap), as its associated contribution is equal to 0.04 for an explained part of 0.09 at the mean, and 0.067 for an explained part of 0.129 at the 75th percentile. The unexplained component is primarily driven by age in all regions. Table 8 reports the corresponding results on the census-matched sample and identifies the same dynamics. In Provincial France, the mean difference of 0.11 is mainly attributed to an unexplained part of 0.09. In Reunion, the negative mean difference of -0.038 is driven by the composition effect of -0.09, with the main contributor being occupying an intermediate profession in the public sector (-0.04).

To further check that the difference is indeed due to the public premium wage overseas, I provide additional results in Appendix 2. I apply the same decompositions after removing the premium for all public-sector employees, thereby decreasing the net hourly wage by 53% in Reunion and 40% in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana. Doing so, the wage gap becomes positive, the composition component is significantly reduced, while the unexplained part remains the same, confirming the public premium wage as the source of the contradicting results between the mainland and overseas departments.

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Note: The explained and unexplained components sum up to the wage gap each year. For instance, in French Guiana in 2018, the mean wage gap is equal to −0.013 and not significant at the 5% threshold. This gap is decomposed into an explained part of −0.073 and an unexplained part of 0.059, both significant.

Figure 8: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the mean (main sample)

Figure 9: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the mean (census-matched sample)

Figure 10: Oaxaca-RIF decomposition of the 75th percentile (main sample)

Figure 11: Oaxaca-RIF decomposition of the 75th percentile (census-matched sample)

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Table 7: Detailed decompositions on main sample (2018)

	Provincial France		Paris region		Reunion		Guadeloupe		Martinique		French Guiana	
	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75
Difference	.0948541***	.1049678***	.0594268***	.0937027***	-.0386489***	-.1118317***	.0155283	-.0028279	-.0419805***	-.0646781**	-.0136275	.0072326
Explained part	.0037268**	-.0247625***	-.0201941***	-.0101858**	-.0861025***	-.188201***	-.0751279***	-.1215187***	-.1159114***	-.1846823***	-.0732672***	-.0873907**
Unexplained part	.0911273***	.1297303***	.0796208***	.1038885***	.0474536***	.0763693***	.0906562***	.1186908***	.0739309***	.1200042***	.0596397***	.0946233**
Explained												
Age	-.0303234***	-.0421048***	-.0424006***	-.0627533***	-.0240584***	-.0324776***	-.0204428***	-.0292257***	-.0262943***	-.0364815***	-.018334***	-.0317144***
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	-.0007825***	-.0022585***	-.0000239	-.0000772	-.0042706***	-.006805***	.004648**	-.0075024*	.0031144**	-.004593*	.0001435	-.000294
Employee (Public)	-.0071268***	-.0049634***	-.007634***	.0004205	-.0048895*	-.019838***	-.0188033***	-.0217875***	-.0216629***	-.0340926***	-.0249503***	-.0272148**
Intermediate Profession (Public)	-.0243456***	-.0355937***	-.0186954***	-.005886***	-.0575546***	-.1272984***	-.0590531***	-.111079***	-.0569132***	-.0944632***	-.0617058***	-.0651291***
Executive (Public)	-.0104291***	-.0178802***	-.0141144***	-.0201127***	-.0118618*	-.0216208*	-.0055071	-.0097747	-.0175415**	-.0259009**	-.0062106	-.0096082
Employee (Private)	.001148***	-.0089601***	-.0014891***	-.006795***	-.0017611	-.0078653**	-.0148528***	-.0123287**	-.0089661***	-.0109317**	.0003482	.0007855
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.0061578***	.0084926***	-.0014222**	-.0011675*	-.0043548*	-.0077774*	.0036589	.0052378	-.0003485	-.0005105	.0003605	.0004557
Executive (Private)	.0433178***	.067415***	.0600791***	.0849313***	.0047136	.008755	.0060703	.009738	.0081698	.0116807	.0200327*	.0288955*
Part-time dummy	.0283523***	.0148678***	.0082485***	-.0011502	.0316982***	.0280276***	.0337139***	.0429253***	.0224056***	.0223346***	.0294738***	.0180786*
Small enterprise	.0017237***	.0018444***	.0062232***	.0037393***	.012529***	.0160125***	.0079519**	.0065034*	.0097354***	.0096708**	.010018*	.0089436
Medium enterprise	-.00619***	-.0077246***	-.0131177***	-.0092763***	-.016486***	-.0236653***	-.0223728***	-.0213914***	-.0165701***	-.0228378***	-.0229981**	-.0242373
Large enterprise	.000649***	.0007244***	.0004996	.0003443	-.0158863***	-.0141764***	.0023835	.0025669	-.0138925***	-.0172931***	.0009949	.000262
Specification error	.0015757**	.0013789	.0036528***	.007597***	.0060796**	.0205281	.0074776*	.0245994	.0028525	.018736	-.0004399	.0133863
Unexplained												
Age	.0998868***	.0844871***	.1040027***	.1479603***	.1118844**	.1376917	.1137786*	.1718567	.048467	.0258702	.2253555**	.2558418
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	-.0021426***	-.002198***	-.0016851***	-.0012054***	-.0057409***	.0000248	-.0050245	-.0042645	-.0031246	-.0013582	-.0076191	.0016556
Employee (Public)	-.0077121***	.0065971***	-.0027029**	.0026298*	-.0292359***	.0097388	-.0054453	.0324927**	-.0027156	.0210247	-.0080148	.0524888**
Intermediate Profession (Public)	-.0128757***	-.0184094***	-.0153292***	.001275	-.0186026**	-.0027427	-.0081548	-.0203786	-.0076951	.0065122	-.034515	-.0135378
Executive (Public)	-.0029143***	.0001503	-.005241***	.0063721***	-.0073365**	-.0011852	-.0036901	.0037721	-.0006591	.0095425	-.0189674**	-.0107562
Employee (Private)	-.0258026***	-.0039526***	-.0427555***	-.0064259***	-.0411695***	-.0025502	.0105082	.0116204	-.0143997	.0089511	-.0319325*	.0021433
Intermediate Profession (Private)	-.004646***	.0044852***	-.0146834***	.002342	-.0074499	.0025828	.0023063	.0046317	-.0065148	-.0008188	-.0059966	.0164657
Executive (Private)	.0026479***	.007322***	-.0015159	.0336148***	-.0022308	.004465	.0033617	.0066865	-.0008849	.0036479	.0021067	.0151247
Part-time dummy	-.0142156***	-.0094642***	.0023431	.0051976*	-.006137	.0024268	-.0107739	-.0370659**	-.0045919	-.0332092**	.0057425	.0016752
Small enterprise	.007694***	.0037945	.0103977***	.0049721	.0145216	.0097498	.0151562	.026225	.0381021*	.0523036*	.0463068*	.0211887
Medium enterprise	.0153197***	.0086155***	.0207174***	.0042085	.0148661	-.018021	.0074642	.0028829	.0100865	.0024852	.0419735	.0362103
Large enterprise	.0034161***	-.0003951	.009738***	.0014877	-.0019001	-.0025816	.0010659	.0062902	.0072331	.0129443	.0018579	.001925
Constant	.0246433***	.0357151**	.0067476	-.1127534***	.0202911	-.0727416	-.024264	-.0842497	-.0039488	-.0094112	-.1606862	-.2959248
Reweighting error	.0078283***	.0129828***	.0095873***	.0142132***	.0056936*	.0095119*	-.0056322	-.0018086	.0145767***	.02152***	.0040282	.0101229
Obs	674111	674111	188138	188138	9371	9371	4422	4422	4375	4375	2246	2246

Note:

Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.

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Table 8: Detailed decompositions on census-matched sample (2018)

	Provincial France		Paris region		Reunion		Guadeloupe		Martinique		French Guiana	
	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75	Mean	P75
Mean difference	.1129673***	.1276325***	.0894019***	.1307622***	-.0389428*	-.1583593***	.0383658	.0082246	-.0140998	-.0342768	.0385806	.0453279
Explained part	.015519***	-.0102802***	.0033155	.0192478***	-.0933184***	-.2207163***	-.05579**	-.0935242*	-.1056395***	-.1715022***	-.0610717	-.1022944*
Unexplained part	.0974483***	.1379127***	.0860864***	.1115144***	.0543756***	.0623571*	.0941557***	.1017488*	.0915397***	.1372254***	.0996524***	.1476223***
Explained												
Age	-.027693***	-.0371062***	-.0440199***	-.0621934***	-.0206179***	-.0256581***	-.01863**	-.0236837**	-.025075***	-.0324232***	-.0212821*	-.0336708
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	-.0012231***	-.0028237***	-.0001251	-.0002445	-.0071425***	-.0095854**	.0059129**	-.0042614	.0029758	-.0084404*	.0007372	-.0044698
Employee (Public)	-.0057939***	-.0028352***	-.0062377***	.0020826***	-.0001296	-.0105304	-.0277366***	-.0230861	-.0201042***	-.027065*	-.0160919*	-.0142959
Intermediate Profession (Public)	-.0171427***	-.0257271***	-.0091036***	.0074457***	-.0497364***	-.1166***	-.0441576***	-.0791469***	-.0578948***	-.094744***	-.0422101**	-.049033*
Executive (Public)	-.0067886***	-.0130851***	-.0082299***	-.0114273***	-.0117632	-.0208019	.0060834	.0107344	-.0121031	-.0176372	-.0015347	-.0031038
Employee (Private)	.0069121***	-.0038014***	.0020162***	-.002888***	.0035724	-.0018893	-.0164282***	-.0141265	-.007421*	-.0072657	.0138008	.0086413
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.0077321***	.010778***	.0011164	.0007157	.0002292	.0004252	.0063165	.0106101	.001005	.0012902	.005324	.0074124
Executive (Private)	.040191***	.0656716***	.0585476***	.0802425***	.0057332	.0098439	.0106866	.0158569	.0179223*	.0246735*	.0214436	.0378425
Part-time dummy	.0302877***	.0148825***	.0102455***	4.32e-06	.0263254***	.021282***	.0371712***	.0314825*	.0288766***	.0293189**	.0105094	.0034682
Small enterprise	.0013209***	.0013975***	.0041073***	.0028428***	.0128055***	.0131424**	.0116282*	.009114	.0044168	.0050491	.0145425	.0175735
Medium enterprise	-.0049107***	-.0060568***	-.0094779***	-.0073938***	-.0158636***	-.0220646***	-.0302047***	-.0320975*	-.0115957*	-.0180845*	-.0240073	-.0371137
Large enterprise	.0008058***	.0009228***	.0021881***	.0015339***	-.0155933***	-.0152269*	.0017744	.0015432	-.0095717*	-.0120998	.0018559	.0008555
High school diploma	.0093575***	.0055227***	.0046775***	.0029206***	.0091692***	.0084046**	.0071755*	.0056705	.0039243	.0039276	.0015102	.0005835
2-3 year college degree	-.0173407***	-.0176044***	-.0171015***	-.0168279***	-.0272352***	-.0374578***	-.0159529**	-.0173072	-.0117918**	-.0147395*	-.0081263	-.008602
Advanced college degree	-.0028883***	-.0026716***	.0082266***	.0097874***	-.0080826*	-.0104258*	-.0038785	-.0067557	-.0120755*	-.0186806*	-.0114587	-.0109856
Specification error	.002693**	.0022562	.0064856***	.0126472***	.0050111	-.003574	.0144497*	.0219292	.0028725	.0154184	-.0060843	-.0173965
Unexplained												
Age	.052341***	.0442303**	.0573971***	.0835252**	.0077416	.1199657	.0693953	.1415979	-.0662742	-.1075472	.3090864**	.4547738*
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	-.0020583***	-.002245***	-.0015485***	-.0012428**	-.0071057**	-.0027478	-.0074832	-.0035443	-.0011313	-.0005914	-.0175491	-.0115677
Employee (Public)	-.0071189***	.0061862***	-.000244	.0017071	-.0312559**	.0119583	-.0290773*	.0178231	.0056523	.0137515	-.0376414	-.0025561
Intermediate Profession (Public)	-.0080622***	-.0165812***	-.0148283***	-.001177	-.0242343*	.0130299	-.0251071*	-.0296604	.0051763	.0165948	-.0547368	.0246623
Executive (Public)	-.0012021**	.0015651	-.0028616**	.0047393*	-.0047827	.0083184	-.0050888	.0018954	.0030639	.0028351	-.0270968*	-.0016485
Employee (Private)	-.0193546***	-.0008521	-.0350975***	-.0069646*	-.040051***	-.0050935	.0114491	.0329205	-.0006354	.0015859	-.0539517*	-.0182519
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.0020796**	.0101843***	-.0076972***	.0062599*	-.0109955*	-.0015796	-.0042039	.0047179	-.003812	-.0081949	-.0153089	.0053377
Executive (Private)	.0058644***	.0100869***	.0058625*	.0315647***	-.0040371	.005176	.0025725	.0041152	.0069923	.0021894	-.0029919	.0272487
Part-time dummy	-.0186323***	-.01305***	-.0036324	.001475	-.0126776	-.0049195	-.018189	-.0415192	-.0170214	-.0336858	.023	.0122906
Small enterprise	.0070741***	.0021573	.0034692	.0067615	.0101242	-.0101435	.0438841	.0422895	.0239093	.0198294	.093685**	.106384*
Medium enterprise	.0146048***	.005379	.0115165*	.0064706	.0212653	-.0217722	.0421302	.035155	.0067839	-.0100587	.075266	.1563309*
Large enterprise	.0033961***	.0005355	.0038731	.0039343	-.0097219	-.0342736*	.0063447	.0146163	.0032189	.0171573	-.0010211	.0025744
High school diploma	-.0032567	-.0025594	-.0027666	.0034231	-.0034789	.0101158	.0299405	.0055321	.0102616	.0074919	-.0033249	-.0354157
2-3 year college degree	-.0129351***	-.0130394***	-.0129063***	.0024706	-.0104588	-.0188033	-.001557	-.0152427	.0091266	.0201258	-.0030712	-.0501205
Advanced college degree	-.0026457**	-.0034168**	-.0060854*	-.0000111	-.009201	-.004511	-.0052402	.0024112	.0012293	-.0012888	-.001293	-.0062393
Constant	.0812459***	.0982525***	.0833773***	-.0449918	.1796397	-.0076105	-.0082939	-.101122	.0858168	.1650763	-.1859044	-.5263722
Reweighting error	.006108***	.0110796***	.0082584***	.0135705***	.0036052	.0052474	-.0073202	-.0102366	.0191828*	.0319548*	.002506	.0101917
Obs	465651	465651	82248	82248	3498	3498	1951	1951	2036	2036	883	883

Note:

Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.

6   Robustness checks

The female employment rate overseas is very low, as can be seen in Figure 12, therefore I include a mean wage gap decomposition corrected for selection using a standard Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). In this model, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is done using a two-stage regression. In the first stage, the probability of having a salaried job given the individual's characteristics is estimated using a probit regression that includes an instrument excluded from the second stage. In the latter, the Mincer regression is estimated, with the inverse Mill's ratio from the previous regression added as a covariate.

Traditional instruments for the first stage regression include variables related to the number and age of children (Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008). However, these may not be suitable for overseas territories as the age at birth of the first child is lower than the mainland average. In Reunion, the share of women having their first child before the age of 20 has decreased over the years, but remains twice as high as in the Antilles and mainland France (Breton et al. 2022). The supposed negative effect of children on the probability of working might then be indistinguishable from their decision to work had they not had children anyway (Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager 2019). Spouse's income or employment status (based on tax data from couples who file jointly) is also not a suitable instrument, as I found it to have an impact both at the first and second stages. In addition, the data does not allow me to take into account the cohabiting partner's income from people who do not declare their taxes together[6].

Instead, I control for selection using 2 alternative exogenous instruments. The first one is tied to the evolution of the labor market in the different territories. I use the cohort-specific participation rate based on Fontaine (2021) and Schirle (2008) shown in Figure 12. They are computed using census data as detailed in Appendix 3. The second instrument is the population size of the individual's birth town at the time of birth, used as a proxy for access to higher education in the absence of data on proximity to college (Card 1999). City-level census counts are available for the years 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, and every year starting in 2006, and missing values are imputed using the nearest available observation.

To form a second sample including individuals who are not working salaried jobs, I use tax data from the entire EDP dataset to add non-working individuals and independent workers. I can do so only starting in 2012 due to tax data availability. For those individuals, no hourly wage measure is used (non-existent for non-working individuals and non-computable for the self-employed, as tax data only provides total annual salary, not the number of hours worked). The information available for those added individuals is thus restricted to their location, age, and gender. Again, to obtain the additional covariate of the level of education, this data is also matched with census data. As the added individuals can not be associated with a socio-professional category or sector, nor can they be divided into part-time and full-time workers, a different set of covariates is used in both stages.

The first stage regression features age, education level, and one of the instruments. The second stage regression is then estimated only on the original sample. The independent

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[6]Unlike couples who are married or in a civil partnership, cohabiting people are required to file separate tax returns as if they were single.

workers are therefore included in the first stage but not in the second stage, as seen in Chen and Wang (2023).

When the employment rate is used as an instrument, I find that it has a significant effect on women's probability of working without directly impacting their wages in 3 overseas territories (Reunion, Guadeloupe, and Martinique) between the years 2013 to 2018[7] (see Appendix 4). When the size of the birth town at birth is used as an instrument, results are similar from 2010 to 2018, with exceptions for 2 regions [8].

As seen in Figures 13 and 14, independently of the instrument used, accounting for selection does not change the overall trajectories of the unexplained and explained parts, further reinforcing the previous results.

Finally, as a specification check, I implement for the difference at the 75th percentile Chernozukhov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013)'s decomposition method based on counterfactual conditional quantile regression. Figure 24 in Appendix 5 shows the results. They are very similar to the main results in Figure 10.

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[7] I also used the employment rate calculated per gender, age category and living situation (cohabiting with a significant other or not) which produce the same results.

[8] Martinique in 2012, 2014, and 2017 and French Guiana in 2010 and 2016.

Figure 12: Employment rate (%) per sex and five-year age group. Data set: Annual Census Survey. Source: Author's own calculations

Figure 13: O-B mean decomposition : Selection model (right) and previous model (left) on main sample (using cohort employment rate as instrumental variable)

Figure 14: O-B mean decomposition : Selection model (right) and previous model (left) on main sample (using size of birth town at birth as instrumental variable)

7 Heterogeneous effects

As presented earlier, the public sector is divided into 3 branches: state, local, and hospital civil services. Overseas, local civil servants make up around 50% of the public service everywhere, followed by state civil servants (between 25% in Reunion and 37% in French Guiana), and hospital civil servants, who account for less than 25%. The hospital public function is the most feminized (between 63.77% in French Guiana and 75.9% in Provincial France), followed by the local civil service (between 52.3% in Reunion and 65.7% in the Paris region). In the state civil service, the proportion of women varies between 48% in French Guiana and 59.3% in Guadeloupe, as seen in Figure 15. These differences in the makeup of public services may mitigate the size of the overall composition effect previously reported.

Therefore, I repeat the same decompositions across public services, keeping all of the private sector and only one public service at a time on the main sample. I do so in the Paris region, Provincial France, and consider overseas departments as a whole to ensure a sufficient sample size. As shown in Figure 16, I only find the overseas wage gap benefiting women to be slightly more important in the hospital service than the rest of the public services, and this is again

explained by the same composition effect.



Figure 15: Proportion of women across public services

Figure 16: O-B decomposition of the mean per public services (main sample)

8   Conclusion

In this paper, I have provided new results regarding the evolution and dynamics of the gender wage gaps in French Overseas Departments. The findings regarding pay gap dynamics on the continent align with the literature. Women self-select into the public sector more than men, and the public sector is more favorable to lower-skilled workers. While both are also true overseas, the public-premia overseas are more prevalent at the mean and third quartile of the distributions for both men and women due to the wage premium.

Indeed, the rise of women in higher deciles of the wage distribution results from a composition effect stemming from their over-representation in the public sector at intermediate positions. The distortion engendered by the premium wage in the public sector raises several questions. First, it would be interesting to explore its potential impact on the private sector's competitiveness. As I document fairly comparable wage distributions in the private sector between overseas departments and the mainland, the reasons for the overseas private sector's sustained competitiveness need to be studied. Second, the relevance of the premium wage is currently debated in France, and not enough is known to predict the impact of its possible removal on local labor markets and gender wage gaps. In the absence of the overseas premium, the public sector might be the source of greater gender inequality than the private sector overseas, as the latter shows lower gender inequality levels. The glass ceiling notably appears to be a challenge in the public sector. Finally, the premium is insufficient for women to reach half of the 10th decile, and they remain underrepresented in executive-level professions.

Appendix 1

Figure 17: Gender wage gap by age. Data set : EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Figure 18: Gender wage gap by socio-professional status. Data set : EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Figure 19: Gender wage gap by sectors. Data set : EDP. Source: Author's own calculations

Appendix 2

Figure 20: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the mean (main sample, removing the public wage premium)

Figure 21: RIF-Oaxaca decomposition of the 75th percentile (main sample, removing the public wage premium)

Appendix 3

The employment rate computed by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) uses the French Labour Force Survey, which includes overseas territories only starting in 2014. The results for overseas territories are then approximated by retropolation to cover the whole period. This variable is available only for the years and age groups of interest in mainland France at the country level, not for the regions of interest. To extend it to the overseas territories, I recalculate the employment rate (by gender, age category, and territory, each year) using census data on employment status.

Each year, the employment rate of 6 five-year age groups is computed to be used as an instrumental variable. As displayed in Figure 12 of the main text, overseas employment rates are consistently lower than those in the mainland. In Guadeloupe and Martinique, the employment rates per age group remain relatively constant over time, occasionally dipping (2008, 2013, and 2018). Across all age groups, women's employment rates are visibly lower than men's, except in the first age group (25-30), where the two are closer. In Reunion, women's employment rate has consistently risen across all age groups (while remaining lower than men's). For comparison, I provide the employment rates computed by INSEE for 2004 to 2019 in France excluding Mayotte, in Figure 22, and my corresponding census-based computed values in Figure 23. The values are especially close starting in 2013 .


Figure 22: Employment rate (%) per sex and five-year age group, France excluding Mayotte, source: Insee 2023

Figure 23: Employment rate (%) per sex and five-year age group, France excluding Mayotte.
Data set: Annual Census Survey. Source: Author's own calculations

Appendix 4

Table 9: Descriptive statistics (Selection sample)

	Men							Women						
		Employed		Unemployed		Self-employed			Employed		Unemployed		Self-employed	
Year	N	Share (%)	Age (mean)	Share (%)	Age (mean)	Share (%)	Age (mean)	N	Share (%)	Age (mean)	Share (%)	Age (mean)	Share (%)	Age (mean)
Provincial France														
2013	543388	66.55	41.26	12.95	42.12	20.50	49.48	544034	60.07	42.05	23.05	43.14	16.88	50.40
2014	541437	66.77	41.42	14.54	43.02	18.69	49.34	536025	59.88	42.72	24.59	44.15	15.53	50.60
2015	541025	66.85	41.49	14.80	43.10	18.35	49.25	528175	59.52	43.33	24.97	44.74	15.51	50.72
2016	534696	67.31	41.45	14.87	43.25	17.83	49.30	515427	59.39	43.88	25.23	45.26	15.38	51.11
2017	538921	68.51	41.54	14.38	43.58	17.11	49.45	507463	59.82	44.44	25.09	46.04	15.09	51.39
2018	541061	69.22	41.72	14.02	43.62	16.75	49.51	500131	59.90	45.07	24.81	46.53	15.29	51.61
Paris region														
2013	134638	75.31	40.87	13.44	41.98	11.24	49.73	133582	67.98	41.42	21.29	42.14	10.73	50.40
2014	135004	75.37	40.96	14.45	42.61	10.18	49.35	131577	67.59	42.15	22.51	42.96	9.91	50.63
2015	135474	75.34	41.05	14.79	42.71	9.87	49.00	129143	66.56	42.87	23.42	43.43	10.02	50.73
2016	135483	76.09	41.05	14.63	42.90	9.28	48.94	126826	66.19	43.51	24.06	44.05	9.75	51.22
2017	137297	76.87	41.15	14.24	42.89	8.88	48.93	124732	66.23	44.12	24.22	44.83	9.55	51.77
2018	138957	77.28	41.34	14.12	43.06	8.60	49.05	123008	65.65	44.82	24.70	45.23	9.65	51.95
Guadeloupe														
2013	4102	50.88	43.34	35.98	44.38	13.14	50.49	4839	49.02	43.80	40.42	44.24	10.56	52.07
2014	4125	51.39	43.52	36.80	44.97	11.81	50.15	4862	49.07	44.50	40.56	44.82	10.37	52.29
2015	4048	51.73	43.67	36.81	45.19	11.46	49.74	4851	48.94	44.99	41.19	45.51	9.87	53.06
2016	4022	51.54	43.59	36.87	45.41	11.59	50.36	4767	49.26	45.74	41.18	46.34	9.57	51.93
2017	4020	52.19	44.00	37.44	45.85	10.37	50.43	4775	49.59	46.12	41.32	47.36	9.09	53.08
2018	4005	52.61	44.33	36.85	46.31	10.54	51.13	4653	49.75	46.88	41.41	47.74	8.83	53.87
Martinique														
2013	3903	55.68	44.35	31.41	45.24	12.91	52.15	4619	52.78	44.39	35.48	44.98	11.73	53.16
2014	3845	55.55	44.45	31.76	45.03	12.69	52.67	4458	53.63	45.28	35.62	45.63	10.74	52.70
2015	3804	56.34	44.46	31.28	45.58	12.38	53.03	4400	54.02	45.84	35.84	46.32	10.14	53.31
2016	3679	57.19	44.57	31.37	45.52	11.44	52.14	4317	54.51	46.63	35.49	46.71	10.01	53.49
2017	3649	58.59	44.77	30.15	45.58	11.26	51.99	4192	54.25	46.97	35.83	47.74	9.92	52.50
2018	3618	59.09	44.65	29.91	46.00	11.00	52.10	4108	54.45	47.53	36.27	48.25	9.27	54.23
French Guiana														
2013	1732	64.09	42.32	29.39	42.20	6.52	50.89	2121	48.18	42.11	47.62	41.29	4.20	51.76
2014	1794	62.49	42.48	31.55	41.93	5.96	49.58	2146	49.25	42.62	46.32	41.91	4.43	48.58
2015	1865	60.80	42.50	32.76	42.33	6.43	50.25	2186	46.43	43.52	49.04	42.87	4.53	51.31
2016	1869	60.89	42.16	32.48	42.10	6.63	49.45	2186	45.52	44.00	50.64	43.15	3.84	51.77
2017	1887	62.32	42.73	31.53	42.12	6.15	49.51	2159	46.60	44.33	49.70	44.59	3.71	50.24
2018	1925	64.16	42.89	29.51	42.64	6.34	49.34	2127	47.53	44.64	48.61	45.26	3.86	50.65
Reunion														
2013	9299	52.97	40.77	34.70	42.41	12.32	48.04	9335	43.11	40.77	48.16	42.56	8.73	48.58
2014	9467	53.89	40.98	34.41	42.37	11.69	48.38	9395	43.89	41.33	47.72	43.43	8.40	48.15
2015	9595	54.77	41.00	33.98	42.87	11.26	48.37	9458	43.39	42.21	48.00	43.99	8.61	48.21
2016	9664	55.10	41.14	34.02	43.24	10.88	48.05	9513	43.47	42.88	47.96	44.88	8.58	48.53
2017	9858	54.89	41.26	34.50	43.46	10.61	47.88	9572	42.92	43.34	48.77	45.55	8.32	49.27
2018	9836	54.94	41.50	34.95	43.93	10.11	47.76	9492	41.79	44.02	49.76	46.23	8.45	49.89

Table 10: Heckman model on selection sample (Reunion)

			Reunion			
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Panel A : Heckman Regression (Second Stage)						
Age	.0076352*** (0.0006)	.0079963*** (0.0005)	.0068868*** (0.0005)	.0066999*** (0.0005)	.006437*** (0.0005)	.0064326*** (0.0005)
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	0.0047994 (0.0276)	0.0318645 (0.0285)	0.0268062 (0.0311)	0.0245655 (0.0298)	0.0253318 (0.0310)	0.0224512 (0.0318)
Employee (Public)	.1197304*** (0.0216)	.110816*** (0.0227)	.1113614*** (0.0234)	.1355624*** (0.0232)	.1017657*** (0.0234)	.12455*** (0.0244)
Intermediate Profession (Public)	.6916356*** (0.0221)	.624733*** (0.0230)	.6161783*** (0.0240)	.6495599*** (0.0237)	.6481885*** (0.0241)	.650107*** (0.0245)
Executive (Public)	.9446802*** (0.0251)	.9521582*** (0.0260)	.9200125*** (0.0266)	.9973409*** (0.0266)	.9793784*** (0.0268)	1.009875*** (0.0277)
Employee (Private)	.1461193*** (0.0205)	.1308863*** (0.0213)	.1167769*** (0.0220)	.1425288*** (0.0218)	.1199374*** (0.0222)	.157035*** (0.0229)
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.3993445*** (0.0225)	.3612326*** (0.0236)	.3466351*** (0.0244)	.3602615*** (0.0242)	.3638582*** (0.0245)	.3783982*** (0.0252)
Executive (Private)	.7629607*** (0.0269)	.7508431*** (0.0272)	.7672196*** (0.0286)	.7883591*** (0.0285)	.7749478*** (0.0287)	.7913383*** (0.0289)
Small enterprise	.0937919*** (0.0140)	.0806123*** (0.0144)	.1066897*** (0.0153)	.0949748*** (0.0155)	.1056028*** (0.0158)	.0824044*** (0.0157)
Medium enterprise	.1522836*** (0.0153)	.1335319*** (0.0157)	.1476922*** (0.0166)	.1561023*** (0.0168)	.1807258*** (0.0170)	.1632941*** (0.0169)
Large enterprise	.260989*** (0.0187)	.2790789*** (0.0192)	.2798086*** (0.0202)	.2923263*** (0.0208)	.2801028*** (0.0211)	.2717492*** (0.0210)
Part-time dummy	-.1988587*** (0.0096)	-.2397725*** (0.0097)	-.2303705*** (0.0103)	-.247879*** (0.0106)	-.2487107*** (0.0108)	-.2404132*** (0.0107)
Inverse Mill's ratio	0.0456374 (0.0382)	0.0169826 (0.0337)	0.0148201 (0.0317)	0.0439427 (0.0286)	.0605412* (0.0264)	0.0328875 (0.0253)
Constant	1.819873*** (0.0339)	1.866141*** (0.0346)	1.916978*** (0.0366)	1.874268*** (0.0367)	1.889175*** (0.0379)	1.901118*** (0.0385)
#	4024	4123	4104	4135	4108	3967
Panel B : Heckman Regression (First stage)						
Age	-.0079706*** (0.0014)	-0.00208 (0.0015)	0.0020523 (0.0015)	.0097851*** (0.0016)	.0120694*** (0.0015)	.0219543*** (0.0017)
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	2.650763*** (0.1955)	2.922798*** (0.1835)	3.329963*** (0.1865)	4.132538*** (0.2024)	4.353069*** (0.1903)	4.593708*** (0.1954)
Constant	-1.062632*** (0.1352)	-1.430566*** (0.1343)	-1.818788*** (0.1363)	-2.596573*** (0.1509)	-2.814546*** (0.1406)	-3.525472*** (0.1609)
#	9335	9395	9458	9513	9572	9492
Panel C : Ordinary Least Squares						
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	-0.0822499 (0.0810)	-0.0227202 (0.0783)	-0.031484 (0.0768)	-0.1282711 (0.0911)	-.1829852* (0.0870)	-0.1056549 (0.0847)
R-squared	0.6411	0.6242	0.5957	0.6049	0.6099	0.6051
Adjusted R-squared	0.6399	0.6231	0.5944	0.6037	0.6087	0.6038
#	4024	4123	4104	4135	4108	3967

Note:
Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.
Panel A reports Heckman model estimates in women subsamples in overseas departments from 2013 to 2018, and Panel B reports the corresponding first stages. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of log hourly wage with the same control variables as in Panel A with the addition of the cohort-specific employment rate in women subsamples (full results not reported due to space contraints).

Table 11: Heckman model results on selection sample (Guadeloupe)

			Guadeloupe			
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Panel A : Heckman Regression (Second Stage)						
Age	.0082844*** (0.0006)	.0080249*** (0.0006)	.0084605*** (0.0006)	.0074366*** (0.0006)	.0078728*** (0.0007)	.0073647*** (0.0007)
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	.1589651*** (0.0331)	.1829128*** (0.0335)	.2129242*** (0.0354)	.2434343*** (0.0342)	.2242599*** (0.0383)	.1819565*** (0.0372)
Employee (Public)	.2169785*** (0.0285)	.2042721*** (0.0291)	.21623*** (0.0308)	.2406121*** (0.0294)	.2338529*** (0.0327)	.219458*** (0.0322)
Intermediate Profession (Public)	.5968215*** (0.0289)	.5670754*** (0.0292)	.5702486*** (0.0314)	.5842902*** (0.0300)	.589488*** (0.031)	.5237642*** (0.0322)
Executive (Public)	.8814979*** (0.0315)	.868619*** (0.0322)	.883758*** (0.0342)	.8895075*** (0.0336)	.9243415*** (0.0372)	.8811472*** (0.0369)
Employee (Private)	.1542152*** (0.0268)	.1441687*** (0.0268)	.1650949*** (0.0288)	.1455407*** (0.0273)	.1170396*** (0.0300)	.0887957*** (0.0300)
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.3670174*** (0.0291)	.3715076*** (0.0298)	.3712436*** (0.0321)	.3637006*** (0.0302)	.3665731*** (0.0338)	.3295114*** (0.0334)
Executive (Private)	.7566309*** (0.0327)	.7401046*** (0.0334)	.7832041*** (0.0356)	.7737189*** (0.0355)	.8051105*** (0.0390)	.7738777*** (0.0367)
Small enterprise	.1100672*** (0.0154)	.0828155*** (0.0162)	.1103832*** (0.0162)	.1192833*** (0.0163)	.1275125*** (0.0179)	.1165267*** (0.0179)
Medium enterprise	.2076736*** (0.0178)	.1983131*** (0.0187)	.2257356*** (0.0188)	.2150412*** (0.0189)	.1959441*** (0.0206)	.1917726*** (0.0207)
Large enterprise	.2627949*** (0.0295)	.1847391*** (0.0322)	.2146055*** (0.0320)	.2470312*** (0.0343)	.2468375*** (0.0382)	.2197013*** (0.0348)
Part-time dummy	-.1258835*** (0.0124)	-.1743011*** (0.0129)	-.1652892*** (0.0131)	-.2145389*** (0.0137)	-.2314847*** (0.0151)	-.2284628*** (0.0151)
Inverse Mill's ratio	0.057886 (0.0392)	0.0545428 (0.0387)	0.0378742 (0.0378)	0.0496712 (0.0355)	0.0529261 (0.0375)	0.0479936 (0.0402)
Constant	1.770854*** (0.0414)	1.822631*** (0.0424)	1.780325*** (0.0457)	1.81944*** (0.0461)	1.826452*** (0.0505)	1.894502*** (0.0534)
#	2372	2386	2373	2348	2367	2315
Panel B : Heckman Regression (First stage)						
Age	-.0078186*** (0.0018)	-.0053642** (0.0018)	0.0015627 (0.0019)	0.0017999 (0.0019)	.0087295*** (0.0020)	.0066067*** (0.0019)
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	2.497893*** (0.2074)	3.262913*** (0.2571)	3.098883*** (0.2333)	3.91086*** (0.2727)	4.222227*** (0.2768)	4.092383*** (0.3029)
Constant	-.932797*** (0.1513)	-1.473415*** (0.1795)	-1.794996*** (0.1831)	-2.26922*** (0.1987)	-2.766767*** (0.2101)	-2.486246*** (0.2063)
#	4839	4862	4851	4767	4775	4653
Panel C : Ordinary Least Squares						
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	-0.0966254 (0.0666)	-0.118972 (0.0851)	-0.0772777 (0.0779)	-0.131993 (0.0928)	-0.1504466 (0.1081)	-0.1307175 (0.1046)
R-squared	0.6213	0.6038	0.5927	0.5870	0.5688	0.5644
Adjusted R-squared	0.6192	0.6017	0.5904	0.5847	0.5664	0.5619
#	2372	2386	2373	2348	2367	2315

Note:
Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.
Panel A reports Heckman model estimates in women subsamples in overseas departments from 2013 to 2018, and Panel B reports the corresponding first stages. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of log hourly wage with the same control variables as in Panel A with the addition of the cohort-specific employment rate in women subsamples (full results not reported due to space contraints).

Table 12: Heckman model results on selection sample (Martinique)

	Martinique					
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Panel A : Heckman Regression (Second Stage)						
Age	.008325*** (0.0006)	.0077426*** (0.0006)	.0080587*** (0.0006)	.0086659*** (0.0006)	.00855*** (0.0007)	.0078548*** (0.0007)
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	.0832762** (0.0314)	.1498723*** (0.0335)	.1231487*** (0.0339)	.1671275*** (0.0346)	.1425081*** (0.0348)	.1500657*** (0.0372)
Employee (Public)	.1652066*** (0.0257)	.2139044*** (0.0274)	.2017933*** (0.0277)	.2339022*** (0.0286)	.2219997*** (0.0290)	.2202301*** (0.0305)
Intermediate Profession (Public)	.5471581*** (0.0265)	.5385591*** (0.0277)	.5086937*** (0.0284)	.5580372*** (0.0291)	.5433129*** (0.0293)	.5400351*** (0.0307)
Executive (Public)	.8735714*** (0.0305)	.8762033*** (0.0322)	.8493157*** (0.0323)	.8709216*** (0.0327)	.8749936*** (0.0338)	.8842558*** (0.0359)
Employee (Private)	.1262109*** (0.0240)	.153736*** (0.0257)	.1070019*** (0.0261)	.1219372*** (0.0273)	.1270429*** (0.0273)	.1386662*** (0.0288)
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.3592333*** (0.0268)	.3853571*** (0.0286)	.3355672*** (0.0291)	.344926*** (0.0299)	.3747756*** (0.0301)	.3954366*** (0.0315)
Executive (Private)	.8019481*** (0.0313)	.7896588*** (0.0325)	.7800956*** (0.0329)	.7818461*** (0.0348)	.865831*** (0.0353)	.7732599*** (0.0369)
Small enterprise	.1113862*** (0.0155)	.1117538*** (0.0161)	.0837729*** (0.0167)	.1161726*** (0.0166)	.1011132*** (0.0178)	.0796049*** (0.0185)
Medium enterprise	.2497458*** (0.0185)	.2230437*** (0.0191)	.1943095*** (0.0198)	.1890586*** (0.0197)	.1993641*** (0.0210)	.1702212*** (0.0217)
Large enterprise	.2596561*** (0.0219)	.2606036*** (0.0229)	.2432884*** (0.0238)	.256445*** (0.0246)	.2749705*** (0.0255)	.2337833*** (0.0260)
Part-time dummy	-.1513497*** (0.0131)	-.2224706*** (0.0133)	-.2131897*** (0.0137)	-.2541366*** (0.0143)	-.2481447*** (0.0151)	-.2506601*** (0.0159)
Inverse Mill's ratio	0.0069615 (0.0348)	.0710568* (0.0349)	.0708502* (0.0346)	0.0265229 (0.0354)	.0967783* (0.0359)	0.0561408 (0.0346)
Constant	1.822441*** (0.0385)	1.794524*** (0.0416)	1.834673*** (0.0424)	1.805036*** (0.0444)	1.780921*** (0.0462)	1.862731*** (0.0487)
#	2438	2391	2377	2353	2274	2237
Panel B : Heckman Regression (First stage)						
Age	-.0073985*** (0.0018)	-.003743* (0.0019)	-0.0017344 (0.0019)	0.001521 (0.0020)	.0090096*** (0.0022)	.0101672*** (0.0021)
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	2.590535*** (0.1865)	2.455813*** (0.1726)	2.657451*** (0.1818)	3.309052*** (0.2343)	3.742361*** (0.2501)	4.364593*** (0.2582)
Constant	-1.007937*** (0.1516)	-1.15598*** (0.1538)	-1.359057*** (0.1563)	-1.926183*** (0.1956)	-2.61973*** (0.2250)	-3.019706*** (0.2170)
#	4619	4458	4400	4317	4192	4108
Panel C : Ordinary Least Squares						
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	-0.0134608 (0.0636)	-0.1148461 (0.0615)	-.1241227* (0.0625)	-0.0603718 (0.0851)	-.2370815** (0.0900)	-0.156734 (0.0986)
R-squared	0.6116	0.5950	0.5921	0.5906	0.5848	0.5405
Adjusted R-squared	0.6096	0.5928	0.5899	0.5883	0.5824	0.5378
#	2438	2391	2377	2353	2274	2237

Note:
Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.
Panel A reports Heckman model estimates in women subsamples in overseas departments from 2013 to 2018, and Panel B reports the corresponding first stages. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of log hourly wage with the same control variables as in Panel A with the addition of the cohort-specific employment rate in women subsamples (full results not reported due to space contraints).

Table 13: Heckman model results on selection sample (French Guiana)

	French Guiana					
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Panel A : Heckman Regression (Second Stage)						
Age	.0101155*** (0.0008)	.0087763*** (0.0008)	.0081706*** (0.0009)	.0086105*** (0.0011)	.0088608*** (0.0010)	.0066957*** (0.0011)
Skilled/Unskilled worker (Public)	.1045771* (0.0484)	0.0506952 (0.0475)	.1884703*** (0.0518)	.1425141** (0.0505)	.1770498*** (0.0539)	.1742164** (0.0572)
Employee (Public)	.3079574*** (0.0433)	.2697536*** (0.0428)	.3811256*** (0.0470)	.312145*** (0.0447)	.3225797*** (0.0457)	.3274983*** (0.0502)
Intermediate Profession (Public)	.6777015*** (0.0434)	.5915111*** (0.0420)	.7033878*** (0.0465)	.6476892*** (0.0445)	.6115562*** (0.0453)	.6259324*** (0.0484)
Executive (Public)	.9355304*** (0.0492)	.9262179*** (0.0480)	.9940338*** (0.0508)	.896311*** (0.0487)	.9139411*** (0.0512)	.9768492*** (0.0546)
Employee (Private)	.2183497*** (0.0462)	.1977129*** (0.0396)	.2876752*** (0.0449)	.187373*** (0.0426)	.1878456*** (0.0433)	.169115*** (0.0472)
Intermediate Profession (Private)	.5362854*** (0.0462)	.491137*** (0.0443)	.5943784*** (0.0488)	.4761434*** (0.0478)	.5066808*** (0.0481)	.5171807*** (0.0520)
Executive (Private)	.8861981*** (0.0543)	.8285067*** (0.0528)	.8903977*** (0.0573)	.7973391*** (0.0558)	.7603157*** (0.0579)	.8874878*** (0.0592)
Small enterprise	0.0101097 (0.0281)	0.0248089 (0.0276)	.0830549* (0.0303)	.0776581* (0.0305)	.0687984* (0.0314)	0.0299166 (0.0330)
Medium enterprise	.129496*** (0.0324)	.1742038*** (0.0321)	.1952612*** (0.0339)	.160556*** (0.0343)	.1244811*** (0.0348)	.085782* (0.0367)
Large enterprise	.1147514* (0.0453)	.1577953*** (0.0442)	.2318601*** (0.0445)	.2228163*** (0.0481)	.1529135** (0.0491)	.1293462* (0.0541)
Part-time dummy	-.2196714*** (0.0212)	-.2347998*** (0.0204)	-.205598*** (0.0218)	-.2600875*** (0.0229)	-.3178588*** (0.0240)	-.3095034*** (0.0238)
Inverse Mill's ratio	0.1060564 (0.1040)	0.0360747 (0.0991)	-0.0722067 (0.0710)	-0.034686 (0.1103)	0.0477214 (0.0812)	-0.0367758 (0.0721)
Constant	1.664557*** (0.0995)	1.793348*** (0.1022)	1.775075*** (0.0966)	1.844271*** (0.1334)	1.803031*** (0.1050)	1.980343*** (0.1016)
#	1022	1057	1015	994	1006	1011
Panel B : Heckman Regression (First stage)						
Age	-0.0045624 (0.0026)	-.0127011*** (0.0035)	0.0007415 (0.0027)	0.0002668 (0.0030)	0.0011872 (0.0029)	0.0025766 (0.0029)
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	1.904224*** (0.3989)	2.421581*** (0.4567)	3.918008*** (0.5457)	3.303229*** (0.7219)	3.894859*** (0.5835)	4.363867*** (0.5454)
Constant	-.8784268*** (0.2293)	-.410149** (0.1389)	-1.50932*** (0.1934)	-1.495313*** (0.2590)	-1.729567*** (0.2193)	-2.328696*** (0.2610)
#	2121	2146	2186	2186	2159	2127
Panel C : Ordinary Least Squares						
Cohort-specific employment rate (women)	-0.1321917 (0.1684)	-0.0522714 (0.1878)	0.183891 (0.1967)	0.0658965 (0.2405)	-0.1214988 (0.2153)	0.1124735 (0.1938)
R-squared	0.6359	0.6127	0.5939	0.5992	0.5649	0.5691
Adjusted R-squared	0.6312	0.6079	0.5887	0.5939	0.5592	0.5635
#	1022	1057	1015	994	1006	1011

Note:
Significance levels : * 5%; ** 1%; *** 0.1%.
Panel A reports Heckman model estimates in women subsamples in overseas departments from 2013 to 2018, and Panel B reports the corresponding first stages. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of log hourly wage with the same control variables as in Panel A with the addition of the cohort-specific employment rate in women subsamples (full results not reported due to space contraints).

Appendix 5

Figure 24: Chernozukhov decomposition of the 75th percentile (main sample)

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- L'**Equipe de Recherche sur l'Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique** (Research Team on Use of Individuals Data in connection with economic theory), **ERUDITE**, University of Paris-Est Créteil, University of Gustave Eiffel;
- Le **Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques** (Research Centre focused on the analysis of economic policy and its foundations and implications), **EPEE**, University of Evry Paris-Saclay ;
- Le **Centre Pierre Naville** (Research on Work and Urban Policies), **CPN**, University of Evry Paris-Saclay
- Le **Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux** (Group on Analysis of Wage Levels and Trajectories), **GAINS**, Le Mans University
- Le **Centre de Recherches en Economie et en Management**, (Research centre in Economics and Management), **CREM**, University of Rennes 1, University of Caen Basse-Normandie ;
- Le **Groupe de Recherche ANgevin en Économie et Management** (Angevin Research Group in Economics and Management), **GRANEM**, University of Angers ;
- Le **Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit** (Research centre in Economics and Law) **CRED**, University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas ;
- Le **Laboratoire d'Economie et de Management Nantes-Atlantique** (Laboratory of Economics and Management of Nantes-Atlantique) **LEMNA**, Nantes University ;
- Le **Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'étude du politique Hannah Arendt – Paris-Est**, **LIPHA-PE**, University of Paris-Est Créteil and University of Gustave Eiffel ;
- Le **Centre d'Economie et de Management de l'Océan Indien**, **CEMOI**, University of La Réunion ;
- Le **Laboratoire d'économie de Poitiers**, **LéP**, University of Poitiers ;
- L'UMR **Structures et marchés agricoles, ressources et territoires**, **SMART**, INRAE, Agro Rennes-Angers Institute ;
- Le **Centre de recherche en économie et en droit sur le développement insulaire**, **CREDDI**, University of the Antilles.

TEPP brings together 230 teacher-researchers and 100 doctoral students. It is both one of the main academic operators in the evaluation of public policies in France, and the largest multidisciplinary federation of research on work and employment. It responds to the demand for impact assessment of social programs using advanced technologies combining theoretical and econometric modeling, qualitative research techniques and controlled experiences.