WORKING PAPER

N° 2026-10

COORDINATION-BASED PLACE POLICIES AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM THE CITES EDUCATIVES PROGRAM

MOUSSA KHEDDACHE, YANNICK L'HORTY, NGOC-THAO NOET

www.tepp.eu

TEPP – Theory and Evaluation of Public Policies - FR CNRS 2042

Coordination-Based Place Policies and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the Cités éducatives Program

Moussa KHEDDACHE[*], Yannick L'HORTY[†], Ngoc-Thao NOET[‡]

June 29, 2026

Abstract

This paper examines whether coordination-based place policies improve educational outcomes in deprived areas. We evaluate the *Cités éducatives* program, introduced in France in 2019 to enhance coordination between educational and social actors in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Using administrative data at the middle-school level and exploiting the program's staggered rollout, we estimate its causal effects with a staggered difference-in-differences design.

We find no evidence of average effects on student performance or on post-grade-nine tracking decisions. However, the program generates heterogeneous effects: outcomes improve for lower-performing students, while effects are null or slightly negative for higher-performing students. These patterns are robust across specifications. Overall, effect sizes are small, suggesting that coordination-based interventions with limited additional resources have a weak impact on average outcomes. This paper contributes to the literature on place-based policies by highlighting the limited aggregate effects of coordination-focused interventions.

Keywords: Education, Cités éducatives, Disadvantaged neighborhoods (QPV), Priority education policy, Urban policy.

JEL: I28, C21, C23, R58

[*] Univ Gustave Eiffel, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP (FR 2042), F-77454, Marne-La-Vallée, France, moussa.kheddache@gmail.com

[†] Univ Gustave Eiffel, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP (FR 2042), F-77454, Marne-La-Vallée, France, yannick.lhorty@univ-eiffel.fr, Corresponding author

[‡] Univ Gustave Eiffel, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP (FR 2042), F-77454, Marne-La-Vallée, France, ngoc-thao.noet@univ-eiffel.fr

1 Introduction

This paper evaluates whether a coordination-based place policy can improve educational outcomes in deprived areas. We study the *Cités éducatives* program, introduced in France in 2019 following the Borloo Report, which primarily targets neighborhoods already covered by priority education policies and aims to reduce socio-economic inequalities in academic achievement.

Place-based educational policies have a long history in France, starting with the introduction of priority education (PE) in the early 1980s. These policies allocate additional resources to schools serving disadvantaged populations, with the objective of reducing achievement gaps linked to social background. These additional resources are primarily used to reduce class sizes and increase teacher compensation through bonuses. Despite substantial and sustained funding—representing around 3.6% of the total education budget in 2023 (Commission des Finances, 2025)—existing evidence finds limited effects on student outcomes (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Caille et al., 2016; Stefanou, 2022), with persistent achievement gaps across areas. A large empirical literature evaluates these policies across several dimensions, including resource allocation (Behaghel et al., 2017), academic achievement (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Caille et al., 2016), and school composition (Davezies & Garrouste, 2020). Overall, these studies find little evidence of significant improvements in student performance.

The Cités éducatives program differs from earlier interventions in that it does not primarily increase resources allocated to targeted schools but instead aims to improve coordination across existing policies at the neighborhood level. This provides an opportunity to evaluate whether improving policy coordination—rather than increasing inputs—affects educational outcomes. More broadly, the program relates to a "last-mile" perspective in public policy (Conseil d'État, 2023), emphasizing the effectiveness of policy delivery at the point of implementation.

We make two contributions. First, we estimate the effect of a policy that operates through coordination rather than resource expansion, contributing to the literature on place-based interventions and priority education (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Bénabou et al., 2004, 2009; Caille et al., 2016; Davezies & Garrouste, 2020). Second, we provide the first causal evidence on the impact of the Cités éducatives program at the national level, exploiting its staggered rollout. While local analyses exist, evidence remains scarce and largely qualitative (Stromboni & Louhab, 2024).

We use administrative data at the middle-school level and implement a staggered difference-in-differences design comparing schools that receive the label to similar schools located in priority neighborhoods and already part of the priority education system. Identification relies on variation in the timing of program adoption across areas. We find no evidence of an average effect of the program on student performance, consistent with the literature on priority education policies (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Bénabou et al., 2009; Caille et al., 2016). We document heterogeneous effects across the achievement distribution: outcomes improve for the lowest-performing students but, in some cases, decrease at

the top of the distribution. These results are consistent with a policy that raises minimum achievement while generating distributional trade-offs.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background and related literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.

2 Literature review

2.1 Mixed evidence on priority education policies

Since the seminal contribution of Coleman (1966), a large body of work has examined policies aimed at reducing educational inequalities associated with socio-economic backgrounds. These policies seek to compensate for structural disadvantages affecting students from disadvantaged environments and are motivated by the objective of reducing achievement gaps across socio-economic groups. A wide range of interventions has been implemented in both developed (Gilleece et al., 2025; Verelst et al., 2020) and developing countries (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2018; Bellei, 2011). These policies can target individuals—through interventions directed at students or households (De Ree et al., 2023; Khiem et al., 2020; Klopfenstein, 2004; Nielsen, 2023)—or operate at the place level by allocating additional resources to deprived areas (Coleman, 1966; Gilleece et al., 2025; Matsudaira et al., 2012; Van der Klaauw, 2008). The latter approach typically relies on socio-economic or demographic criteria to identify target populations and aims to compensate for disparities in initial conditions.

The empirical literature on place-based educational policies yields mixed results. In the United States, Title I programs constitute one of the earliest large-scale compensatory policies. Existing evaluations find no significant effects on student achievement in several contexts (Matsudaira et al., 2012; Van der Klaauw, 2008). Similarly, in Ireland, Gilleece et al. (2025) exploit a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the DEIS program and find no significant effects on test scores, examination outcomes, or school retention rates. Evidence from the Netherlands also points to limited effectiveness. Leuven et al. (2007) analyze two compensatory funding schemes using a regression discontinuity design and find no positive effects, with some negative impacts depending on the type of resources provided. These findings highlight that the nature of inputs may matter for policy effectiveness. More positive evidence exists in some contexts. In England, the Pupil Premium has been associated with reductions in achievement gaps, particularly at the primary level (Gorard, 2022). One proposed mechanism is that per-pupil funding may create incentives for schools to enroll disadvantaged students, although the extent to which this explains the observed effects remains debated.

The French case is broadly consistent with these international findings. Early evaluations of priority education zones (ZEP[1]) show no significant effects on student achievement

[1]ZEP (Zones d'éducation prioritaire) were areas targeted by early French education priority policies, introduced in the 1980s to allocate additional resources to schools serving disadvantaged students.

and document changes in teacher composition (Bénabou et al., 2004, 2009), including increased teacher mobility despite financial incentives (Prost, 2013). Subsequent programs, such as *réseaux ambition réussite* (RAR[2]), also fail to generate improvements in academic outcomes and may produce unintended signaling effects (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Caille et al., 2016). In addition, Davezies and Garrouste (2020) show that more advantaged households may engage in avoidance behaviors, affecting school composition. More recent studies suggest heterogeneous effects. Class size reductions in REP+ schools lead to improvements in French and mathematics, particularly for initially lower-performing students (Andreu et al., 2021). Financial incentives for teachers increase applications to disadvantaged schools (Silhol & Wilner, 2023). Targeted interventions such as boarding schools also generate positive effects, largely driven by increased supervised study time rather than changes in instructional content (Behaghel et al., 2017).

Overall, the literature suggests that place-based educational policies relying primarily on additional resources tend to generate modest and heterogeneous effects, with outcomes depending on both policy design and implementation.

2.2 Modest Effects of Urban Place-Based Policies

In parallel to educational policies, place-based urban policies have targeted deprived areas since the 1980s. These policies rely on socio-economic indicators—such as income levels, poverty rates, and crime—to identify target neighborhoods and aim to promote local development and reduce territorial inequalities (L'Horty & Morin, 2016). They typically combine interventions across multiple domains, including education, employment, housing, and urban renewal, reflecting a multidimensional approach to disadvantage.

In France, the geography of priority education and urban policy often overlaps. A large majority of priority education schools are located in or in close proximity to priority urban neighborhoods[3] (Cour des comptes, 2018). These policies are implemented through partnerships between the central government, local authorities, and non-state actors, reflecting a multi-level governance structure that is intended to facilitate coordination across sectors (David, 2001). However, this institutional complexity also raises challenges in terms of both implementation and evaluation.

Empirical evidence on the effects of such policies remains mixed. For instance, evaluations of "Zones Franches Urbaines" (ZFU) in France show positive effects on local economic activity, but these gains appear to be partly driven by spatial reallocation rather than net creation, and their impact on residents' employment outcomes remains uncertain

[2]RAR (Réseaux ambition réussite) were a subset of priority education networks introduced in the mid-2000s in France, targeting the most disadvantaged schools with additional resources and support. They were later replaced by the REP and REP+ classification. REP (Réseaux d'éducation prioritaire) are school networks serving disadvantaged students, introduced in 2015 as part of a reform of education priority policies, providing additional resources and support to participating schools. REP+ (Réseaux d'éducation prioritaire renforcés) are the most disadvantaged subset of REP networks, receiving additional resources and stronger support measures compared to standard REP schools.

[3]99% of REP+ schools are located less than one kilometer from a disadvantaged area, compared with 81.5% of REP schools

(Malgouyres & Py, 2016). This highlights a broader concern in the evaluation of place-based policies: measured effects at the local level may not translate into aggregate gains.

More generally, institutional reports emphasize that existing evaluations of priority urban neighborhoods are often partial and fragmented, focusing on specific dimensions or limited geographic areas, and frequently lacking credible counterfactuals (Cour des comptes, 2020). These limitations complicate the interpretation of estimated effects and contribute to the heterogeneity of findings across studies.

This pattern is consistent with the broader international literature on place-based policies. In the United States, large-scale urban programs such as Choice Neighborhoods aim to revitalize disadvantaged areas through integrated interventions. Available evaluations, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, find limited effects on residents' socio-economic trajectories despite observable improvements in physical infrastructure (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development & Urban Institute, 2024). One interpretation is that the scale and duration of funding may be insufficient relative to the structural challenges faced by targeted neighborhoods.

In Europe, similar policies also yield heterogeneous results. Evidence from the Netherlands suggests that targeted neighborhoods are not necessarily characterized by strong social isolation, raising questions about the relevance of certain policy objectives such as social mixing (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008). In the United Kingdom, the New Deal for Communities program generated modest improvements in employment outcomes, but identifying causal effects remains challenging due to the coexistence of multiple interventions and the absence of convincing counterfactuals (Romero & Noble, 2008).

A common feature of these policies is their reliance on a multiplicity of instruments and actors. While this integrated approach is intended to address complex forms of disadvantage, it also creates coordination challenges and complicates both implementation and evaluation. In particular, the coexistence of multiple programs targeting the same populations makes it difficult to isolate the marginal effect of any single intervention. This limitation is central to understanding the modest and heterogeneous effects documented in the literature.

2.3 The Cités éducatives Program

The Cités éducatives program (hereafter CE) is a public policy intervention aimed at strengthening coordination between educational and social policies in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (*quartiers prioritaires de la politique de la ville*[4] (QPV)). The program operates through the attribution of a label to selected territories, which grants local authorities access to public funding to support educational and socio-educational initiatives targeting individuals aged 0 to 25.

[4]QPV (Quartiers prioritaires de la politique de la ville) are officially designated disadvantaged neighborhoods in France, defined using income-based thresholds. They constitute the main geographic target of French place-based policies aimed at reducing socio-economic disparities.

Access to the program is based on a competitive application process initiated by local governments. Municipalities apply by submitting a project focused on a specific priority neighborhood within their jurisdiction. Applications are then evaluated and selected by the *Agence Nationale de la Cohésion des Territoires* (ANCT[5]) according to nationally defined criteria. As participation is voluntary, labeled territories may differ systematically from non-labeled ones. This selection process raises concerns about endogenous program placement, which constitutes a central challenge for the empirical identification of program effects.

The CE program operates at the intersection of two policy frameworks: priority education and urban policy. Prior to its introduction, many stakeholders in priority neighborhoods had developed educational initiatives that often overlapped in scope and objectives. Unlike traditional priority education policies, which mainly rely on allocating additional resources to schools, CE seeks to improve the coordination and articulation of existing interventions at the neighborhood level. Its underlying rationale is that policy effectiveness may be constrained not only by the level of resources available, but also by the capacity to coordinate delivery across actors and sectors. This approach is consistent with a "last-mile" perspective on public policy implementation, which emphasizes the effectiveness of delivery at the point of contact with beneficiaries (Conseil d'État, 2023). Rather than substituting for existing policies, CE seeks to complement them by reinforcing educational support at the neighborhood level and financing initiatives that are not covered by other programs.

From a budgetary perspective, the program relies primarily on funding from urban policy budgets. Over the period 2019–2024, total state funding amounts to approximately €291.8 million, corresponding to an average of about €350,000 per area per year (Cour des comptes, 2025). These resources are used to finance a wide range of locally defined interventions, including parental support programs, extracurricular activities, educational projects, and prevention initiatives. The decentralized and heterogeneous nature of these actions implies that the CE label does not correspond to a single, standardized treatment, but rather to a bundle of coordinated interventions whose content varies across territories.

The program was rolled out gradually through successive waves of designation: 80 territories were labeled in 2019–2020, 46 in 2020–2021, and 82 in 2021–2022. A fourth wave took place in 2025 but is not included in the empirical analysis. This staggered implementation generates variation in the timing of exposure to the program across territories, which we exploit for identification.

Eligibility criteria for the first waves of the program were defined by a central government instruction (Gouvernement français, 2020). Eligible territories were required to belong to a priority urban neighborhood with more than 5,000 inhabitants, face significant urban and social challenges—often within the framework of urban renewal programs—and include at least one school in the most disadvantaged category of priority education (REP+). In later waves, these criteria were partially relaxed, broadening eligibility while maintaining a

[5]The Agence Nationale de la Cohésion des Territoires (ANCT) is a French government agency supporting local authorities in disadvantaged neighborhoods to coordinate social, educational, and urban development policies.

focus on disadvantaged areas (Cour des comptes, 2025). These eligibility rules contribute to shaping the population of treated areas and are relevant for assessing the comparability of treated and non-treated units.

The program is implemented at the neighborhood level, but its operational structure is closely tied to the school system. In practice, a middle school within the designated area is typically identified as a lead institution responsible for coordinating local actions. This school receives a dedicated annual grant (€30,000) and plays a central role in organizing and implementing program activities. As a result, middle schools constitute a natural unit of analysis for evaluating the program.

This institutional structure has two important implications for the empirical analysis. First, treatment can be defined at the level of schools located within labeled neighborhoods, even though the policy itself is assigned at the neighborhood level. Second, the outcomes we observe reflect not only direct educational interventions but also broader changes in the local coordination of policies affecting students. In this paper, we therefore evaluate the impact of exposure to the CE label on school-level outcomes, using middle schools located in priority neighborhoods as the unit of observation. The estimated effects should be interpreted as the impact of improved coordination and associated local interventions, rather than the effect of a single, clearly defined policy input.

Finally, the staggered rollout of the program across territories provides a source of quasi-experimental variation. By comparing schools in labeled areas to similar schools in non-labeled priority neighborhoods and exploiting differences in the timing of program adoption, we implement a staggered difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the causal impact of the program.

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Our analysis draws on a dataset that combines national administrative sources (INSEE[6]) with detailed territorial information from the geographic information systems of the Politique de la ville (SIG[7]) and the Archipel Database[8], covering the period 2017–2024. These data allow us to document educational outcomes aggregated at the lower-secondary-school level (success at the Diplôme national du brevet (DNB)[9]), post–middle school track choices), school characteristics (average teacher age, mobility and transfer requests, share of part-

[6]INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) is the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, responsible for producing official statistics on the French economy, population, and society.

[7]https://sig.ville.gouv.fr

[8]Archipel Database is an administrative dataset managed by the French Ministry of Education, containing detailed school-level information on students, staff, resources, and programs in French middle schools.

[9]Diplôme national du brevet (DNB) is the national examination taken at the end of lower secondary school (grade nine) in France, assessing students' knowledge in core subjects before entering upper secondary education.

time teachers, social position index), as well as local socioeconomic contexts (employment rate and demographic structure within QPV).

We use the following outcomes to measure student achievement: pass rate at the brevet, rates of honors ('satisfactory', 'good', and 'very good'[10]), continuous assessment scores, written exam scores in mathematics and French, and the distribution of test scores (below 8, between 8 and 10, and between 10 and 12 out of 20). We also construct indicators of students' educational transitions, such as the proportion of pupils continuing to general, vocational, or CAP[11] tracks and the share of students repeating ninth grade. All outcome variables are aggregated at the school-by-year level.

To geolocate middle schools associated with a QPV, we use the SIG to identify schools located within QPV boundaries or within a 500-meter buffer zone.

The final sample includes 1,965 middle schools. This figure, smaller than the 6,950 public middle schools in France, reflects a deliberate restriction to institutions belonging to at least one of the following policy categories: Éducation prioritaire (EP), QPV, or CE. We introduce these labels once and subsequently refer to them by their acronyms.

Among these 1,965 schools, the first CE cohort comprises 214 treated institutions (10.89%). The first wave consists of 179 schools that are both in EP and located within a QPV, 16 EP schools outside QPVs, 14 QPV schools outside EP areas, and 5 schools that are neither in EP nor in QPV zones (Figure 1).

The observed distribution indicates that belonging to an EP or QPV area was de facto a requirement to obtain CE labeling: 97.66% of first-wave schools have at least one of these statuses, compared with 90.08% in the second wave and 86.86% in the third. This pattern shows that applications and approvals were not random: schools in more deprived areas were more likely to obtain the label. This tendency is particularly strong in the first wave, while subsequent waves exhibit a gradual relaxation of selection criteria. Across all waves, the dominant institutional status combines EP and QPV affiliation (72.94%), suggesting that labeling primarily targeted schools facing cumulative disadvantages. However, this dual status becomes less prevalent over successive waves: 83.64% in the first cohort, 69.42% in the second, and 62.29% in the last. As a result, selection into CE status must be explicitly accounted for in our empirical strategy.

[10]These are the official distinctions awarded in the French Diplôme national du brevet, reflecting increasing levels of student performance.

[11]CAP means *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle*. It is a vocational certificate typically completed in two years after lower secondary school (grade nine), preparing students to enter the labor market.



Figure 1: Distribution of middle schools by status

3.2 Empirical strategy

Evaluating a program that builds on France's EP raises several methodological challenges, most notably related to selection bias and composition effects. Schools covered by EP serve students from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds and, on average, enroll pupils with lower prior achievement than schools outside EP. As a result, even in the absence of any policy intervention, these schools would tend to display weaker academic performance.

This selection problem is well documented in the literature on priority education. For instance, middle schools in RAR were selected based on strict criteria, including at least two-thirds of the students from disadvantaged backgrounds and at least 10% of students who had repeated a grade two times or more by the time they entered sixth grade. These criteria imply that schools covered by such schemes are structurally different in both their social and academic profiles from other schools. A baseline regression comparison between schools benefiting from the program and other schools would therefore yield a biased estimate of the program's effect.

In the case of CE, the labeling process operates in two stages: local authorities first apply voluntarily, and applications are then screened and approved by central and regional administrations. This two-step mechanism implies that territories receiving the label may systematically differ from those that do not. Not all eligible areas chose to apply, which explains the presence, in our data, of comparable middle schools that were never labeled.

To limit the resulting selection bias, it is therefore necessary to construct a control group made up of schools that are as similar as possible to treated schools.

In this study, we exploit the program's eligibility criteria to define a relevant comparison group. During the first three waves of labeling, two conditions remained relatively stable: the size of the QPV and the presence of at least one middle school under EP. On this basis, we construct a control group of EP middle schools attached to QPV that satisfy these criteria but did not receive the CE label. The treatment group is defined using the same logic. The resulting sample consists of 296 labeled middle schools and 139 comparable non-labeled schools (see Section 3.1). This restriction entails a standard trade-off between internal and external validity. Our analysis does not estimate the average impact of the program on all French middle schools, but rather on a subset of comparable schools that satisfy the eligibility conditions. In return, this design enhances the credibility of our empirical identification. Moreover, since all schools in our sample are located in QPV and belong to EP, this approach also limits the influence of other territorial initiatives that could simultaneously affect these areas. In addition, by construction, this strategy nets out any direct effects that could be attributed to EP status itself.

To identify the causal effect of CE labeling, we rely on a difference-in-differences framework. Identification rests on the standard parallel trends assumption, according to which, in the absence of the program, treated and control schools would have followed similar trajectories. Three features of our setting strengthen the plausibility of this assumption. First, by constructing the control group from EP schools located in comparable QPV, we limit structural differences between treated and non-treated schools. Second, the staggered rollout of the program across several labeling waves generates temporal variation in exposure to CE that can be exploited to identify its impact. Third, because all schools in the sample operate within a similar institutional environment — in particular, in terms of territorial policies and education reforms — the risk that the estimated effects reflect concurrent, unobserved shocks is reduced.

We estimate the impact of CE using several econometric specifications, including a two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences model (TWFE) with school and year fixed effects:

$$Y_{g,t} = \gamma_t + \lambda_g + \beta^{fe} \cdot CE_{g,t} + \varepsilon_{g,t} \tag{1}$$

where :

- $Y_{g,t}$ denotes the outcome variable for unit g at time t;
- $CE_{g,t}$ is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if unit g is labeled at period t, and β^{fe} is the coefficient capturing the average effect of the policy;
- γ_t represents time fixed effects capturing shocks common to all units in period t;
- λ_g denotes school fixed effects accounting for unobserved time-invariant characteristics;

- $\varepsilon_{g,t}$ is the error term.

In its canonical form with two groups and two periods, a TWFE model identifies the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) under the standard assumptions of parallel trends and no anticipation. However, the recent difference-in-differences literature (Borusyak et al. (2024), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), and Goodman-Bacon (2021)) has shown that, in the presence of staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous treatment effects, the conventional TWFE estimator no longer recovers a simple average of treatment effects but rather a linear combination of group-by-period effects, with weights that can be negative. In such settings, the TWFE estimate can deviate substantially from the ATT (and even have the opposite sign), even when parallel trends and no-anticipation assumptions hold. When treatment is staggered, negative weights arise because already-treated units are used as controls for units that have just switched into treatment.

In our context, CE status is rolled out in a staggered fashion (Figure 8), and given the volatility of funding over time, it is important to rely on estimators that are robust to this structure. The recent literature has proposed several estimators tailored to staggered adoption designs (Borusyak et al. (2024), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2023), and Sun and Abraham (2021)).

To estimate the impact of CE labeling for the first three waves (2020, 2021, and 2022), we use the estimator proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2023) (henceforth CH). This estimator avoids negative weighting by comparing schools that have just been treated ("switchers") to schools that remain untreated at a given date ("stayers"). Under the assumptions of parallel trends and no anticipation, this estimator identifies the causal effect of the policy for the treated units. However, this approach is relatively demanding in terms of statistical power, as it relies only on a subset of comparisons. To gain robustness, we also estimate the ATT using the estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) (henceforth SA):

$$Y_{g,t} = \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \hat{\alpha}_c \, \mathbf{1}\{g \in c\} + \sum_{t'=1}^{T} \hat{\gamma}_{t'} \, \mathbf{1}\{t = t'\} + \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{\ell = -(c-2),\, \ell \neq 0}^{T-(c-1)} \hat{\beta}^{\text{did}}_{c,\ell} \, \mathbf{1}\{F_g = c,\ t = c-1+\ell\} + \hat{\varepsilon}_{g,t}. \tag{2}$$

where:

- $\hat{\alpha}_c$ denotes cohort fixed effects;
- $\hat{\gamma}_{t'}$ denotes time fixed effects;
- $\hat{\beta}^{\text{did}}_{c,\ell}$ represents the treatment effects for cohort c after ℓ periods of exposure to the treatment;
- $\hat{\varepsilon}_{gt}$ is the error term.

The SA estimator computes an ATT aggregated at the cohort level (a cohort means a group that is treated at the same time) for each treatment period. The control group can be constructed in two ways: either using the last treatment cohort or the never-treated

group. We opt for the never-treated group, as it provides a larger and more stable control set.

CE effects may vary over time, as the program likely requires several years to yield detectable outcomes. Unlike the TWFE estimator, which collapses all post-treatment variation into a single coefficient, an event-study design allows us to trace the dynamic effects of treatment year by year. Although imperfectly testable, this approach also enables us to assess the validity of the parallel trends and no-anticipation assumptions by examining whether pre-treatment coefficients are jointly equal to zero. To implement these tests, we rely on the event-study specification proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2023).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): CE effects primarily manifest at the middle school level, as these are the main beneficiaries of the program. This hypothesis is grounded in the program's governance structure, which systematically designates a middle school as the lead school, as well as in several evaluation reports documenting the predominance of interventions at the lower secondary level (Cour des comptes, 2025; Stromboni & Louhab, 2024).

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Consistent with the program's design, CE labeling does not constitute an additional intervention but rather serves as a coordination tool intended to improve the articulation of existing programs (REP, REP+, PRE). We therefore posit that CE generates indirect effects by enhancing the effectiveness of these pre-existing schemes.

4 Results

The CE label operates through multiple channels and may influence student outcomes across several dimensions. Guided by our hypotheses (H1 and H2), we first examine the effects on standardized academic performance measures, including pass rates and honors at the DNB. This focus reflects H1, which posits that impacts should primarily manifest at the middle school level, the main target of the program. We then assess the effects on post-middle school track choices, capturing the program's objective of broadening students' future educational prospects and testing H2, which predicts that CE generates indirect effects by enhancing the effectiveness of pre-existing education priority programs (REP, REP+, PRE).

4.1 Impact of CE on overall DNB performance

In the Table 1, Column 1 reports TWFE estimates to illustrate potential biases arising from negative weights. Column 2 presents the ATT from the CH estimator, and Column 3 reports the ATT from the SA estimator.

TWFE estimates are generally similar to those from columns 2 and 3, though in some cases they display opposite signs. This discrepancy reflects the presence of negative weights. In other instances, TWFE yields statistically significant estimates while the staggered DiD estimators do not, reflecting its efficiency as the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). By

minimizing variance, TWFE incorporates all available 2×2 comparisons, including those between newly treated units and already-treated units.

Outcome	**TWFE**	**CH**	**SA**
Brevet pass rate	-0.890*	-0.482	-0.489
	(0.509)	(0.607)	(0.657)
Brevet honors rate	-0.358	0.443	0.649
	(0.606)	(0.702)	(0.744)
Pass rate without honors	-0.533	-0.924*	-1.139*
	(0.435)	(0.555)	(0.589)
Pass rate with honors 'satisfactory'	-0.221	-0.162	0.002
	(0.385)	(0.450)	(0.480)
Pass rate with honors 'good'	0.644**	0.856**	0.795*
	(0.327)	(0.389)	(0.408)
Pass rate with honors 'very good'	-0.843**	-0.378	-0.307
	(0.373)	(0.437)	(0.452)
N	3458	2156	3458

Notes : Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. CH = De Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille, SA = Sun & Abraham.

Table 1: Average Effect of CE Labels (ATT) on Brevet Pass Rates

Staggered DiD estimators reveal limited or no effects of CE labeling on overall DNB performance (parallel trends are validated at the 5% level across all outcomes). The CH and SA estimates deliver highly consistent results, which is reassuring. CE has no detectable impact on the DNB pass rate, overall honors rate, or 'satisfactory' honors rate. However, small-magnitude effects emerge for admission without honors and 'good' honors. Specifically, CE reduces the share of students admitted without honors by approximately 1 percentage point (significant at 10% for both estimators). This reduction appears to shift toward higher honors categories, with a statistically significant increase in the 'good' honors rate of roughly 1 percentage point (10% for SA, 5% for CH). Effects on overall DNB performance thus appear modest in magnitude.



Figure 2: Event-study for the overall DNB performance

Event-study estimates provide additional insights into treatment dynamics. Pre-treatment coefficients are jointly indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level across all outcomes (Figure 2). While ATT estimates suggested no effect on the pass rate, the event study reveals a negative impact of -1.63 percentage points in the second year post-treatment (significant at 5%). For the overall honors rate, a positive effect of 3.05 percentage points emerges only in the fifth year post-treatment (significant at 1%). The 'satisfactory' honors rate declines by -1.06 percentage points immediately upon treatment entry (significant at 5%). The positive 'good' honors effect identified in the ATT is concentrated in the first treatment year, though coefficients for years 2, 3, and 5 remain significant at 10%. No effects are detected for 'very good' honors at any horizon.

4.2 Effects of CE on DNB written exam scores

We extend the analysis to written exam scores from the DNB, which provide an objective measure of student achievement. The final DNB score combines two components: (i) continuous assessment over the school year, weighted at 50% of the final grade (reduced from 60% in 2017); and (ii) standardized written terminal exams accounting for the remaining 50%, covering French, mathematics, history-geography-EMC, and sciences (we observe scores for mathematics and French only). Since continuous assessment scores may reflect heterogeneous grading practices across schools, terminal exam scores offer a particularly

informative and comparable measure of learning outcomes[12].

As shown by Murat (1998), grades can depend on average class ability. Terminal exams thus provide a cleaner measure of student skills, less susceptible to cross-school differences in grading standards. We therefore examine CE effects on French and mathematics exam scores, as well as on their distributions.

Outcome	**TWFE**	**CH**	**SA**
Math written exam score	-0.002	-0.019	-0.013
	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.080)
French written exam score	-0.008	-0.030	-0.028
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Share scoring below 8 on the written exam <8	-0.842	-1.299*	-1.476**
	(0.583)	(0.690)	(0.713)
Share scoring between 8 and 10 on the written exam	0.893***	1.760***	2.017***
	(0.327)	(0.417)	(0.439)
Share scoring between 10 and 12 on the written exam	0.508*	0.341	0.316
	(0.305)	(0.403)	(0.407)
Share scoring above 12 on the written exam	-0.583	-0.797	-0.881*
	(0.445)	(0.510)	(0.516)
N	3265	2034	3265

Note : Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. CH = De Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille, SA = Sun & Abraham.

Table 2: Average treatment effects of CE (ATT) on DNB written exam performance

CE labeling yields negative but statistically insignificant effects on both mathematics and French exam scores. However, effects emerge when examining the distribution of written exam scores. The share of scores below 8 declines by 1.3 percentage points (significant at 5% for SA, 10% for CH). This reduction is accompanied by an increase in the share of scores between 8 and 10 of nearly 2 percentage points (significant at 1%) and a smaller, insignificant rise in the 10–12 range.

These results should be interpreted cautiously, as parallel trends hold for CH and TWFE (at 5%) but not for SA. This discrepancy reflects differences in control group construction: CH uses 'stayers' (never-treated and not-yet-treated schools), while SA relies exclusively on never-treated schools.

Finally, we detect a small negative effect (-0.8 percentage points) on the share of scores above 12, significant at 10% only for SA. Overall, CE appears to generate heterogeneous effects on written exams, modestly benefiting students at the lower end of the distribution while marginally penalizing those at the upper end.

[12]We verified that no effects exist on continuous assessment scores. Results are available upon request.



Figure 3: Event-study for the DNB written exam scores

As shown in Figure 3, both the parallel trends and no anticipation assumptions hold prior to treatment for all outcome variables (at the 5% significance level). In mathematics, the label did not produce any statistically significant effect in any treatment period. In contrast, in French, the label slightly lowered scores by about 0.20 points in period 4. For the share of scores below 8, the negative effect observed in the ATT estimates is, in fact, significant only in periods 1 and 5. For the share of scores between 8 and 10, all post-treatment coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Finally, for the share of scores above 12, it appear to have reduced the proportion by around one percentage point in periods 2 and 4.

4.3 Effects of CE Labels on Students' Educational Trajectories

The CE label explicitly aims, through its 'Opening up possibilities' axis, to foster students' educational and professional ambitions. Socially disadvantaged students often have less information about post-secondary options than their peers. We therefore assess the impact of the program on students' track choices after grade nine. CE labels may also influence school dropout, which we examine by analyzing grade repetition rates in labeled schools.

Outcome	TWFE	CH	SA
Share entering the general and technological track	-0.519	-0.692	-0.795
	(0.511)	(0.612)	(0.653)
Share entering the vocational track	0.406	0.437	0.571
	(0.457)	(0.585)	(0.623)
Share entering a CAP apprenticeship program	0.428	0.516*	0.458
	(0.306)	(0.306)	(0.329)
Grade repetition rate	-0.060	0.089	0.109
	(0.153)	(0.195)	(0.213)
N	3265	2034	3265

Notes : Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. CH = De Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille, SA = Sun & Abraham.

Table 3: Average effect of CE labels (ATT) on educational trajectories

Our results indicate that the program does not produce detectable effects on the share of students enrolling in general or technological tracks, nor on vocational tracks leading to a high school diploma equivalency. The label has a small positive effect on the share of students pursuing a CAP (vocational certificate), but the magnitude is limited (0.5 percentage points). Finally, using grade repetition as a proxy, the label does not reduce school dropout. For all outcomes in this section, the parallel trends assumption is not rejected at the 10% significance level.



Figure 4: Event-study for the Students Educational Trajectories

Pre-treatment marginal effects are not statistically significant, confirming that the parallel trends assumption holds for all outcomes. Post-treatment coefficients are not significantly different from zero for any outcome or period, except for the proportion of students pursuing a CAP in period 1. Overall, these results suggest that the CE label had little impact on students' post-grade-nine track choices and did not reduce dropout rates.

4.4 Heterogeneous Effects of CE Labels

When a CE is created, one school is designated as the lead school and receives €30,000 to coordinate CE activities. Lead schools therefore receive stronger treatment than other schools. We examine whether this differential exposure generates detectable heterogeneous effects by restricting the treatment group to lead schools only.

The results for Lead Schools (Table 4) are consistent with previous findings. The CE label affects the share of students receiving honors, which was not observed in the full sample. Specifically, the program increased the share of students receiving honors in lead schools by 1.5 percentage points, a marginal effect significant at the 10% level. Symmetrically, the label significantly decreased (at the 5% level) the share of students admitted without honors. As these effects are of similar magnitude, no effect is detected on overall diploma pass rates. For the 'good' honors category, treatment increased the share by 1 percentage point. Consistent with earlier results, the program decreased the share of exam scores below 8 by approximately 2 percentage points and increased the share of scores between 8 and 10 by a similar magnitude. The only previously significant outcome that is no longer significant in this restricted sample is the share of students pursuing a CAP.

Outcome	TWFE	CH	SA
Brevet pass rate	-0.756	-0.125	-0.029
	(0.676)	(0.781)	(0.849)
Brevet honors rate	0.257	1.018	1.551*
	(0.769)	(0.878)	(0.921)
Pass rate without honors	-1.013*	-1.142	-1.580**
	(0.604)	(0.728)	(0.757)
Pass rate with honors 'satisfactory'	-0.445	-0.884	-0.544
	(0.495)	(0.578)	(0.606)
Pass rate with honors 'good'	0.672	1.015*	1.047*
	(0.411)	(0.525)	(0.536)
Pass rate with honors 'very good'	-0.675	0.108	0.171
	(0.463)	(0.549)	(0.554)
Math written exam score	0.029	0.005	0.015
	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.101)
French written exam score	0.006	0.079	0.084
	(0.074)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Share scoring below 8 on the written exam <8	-1.035	-1.994**	-2.082**
	(0.776)	(0.871)	(0.904)
Share scoring between 8 and 10 on the written exam	0.758*	1.926***	2.198***
	(0.400)	(0.502)	(0.528)
Share scoring between 10 and 12 on the written exam	0.429	-0.017	0.017
	(0.354)	(0.491)	(0.500)
Share scoring above 12 on the written exam	-0.177	0.090	-0.157
	(0.536)	(0.668)	(0.667)
Share entering the general and technological track	-0.555	-0.277	-0.318
	(0.677)	(0.796)	(0.851)
Share entering the vocational track	0.225	-0.332	-0.151
	(0.580)	(0.768)	(0.804)
Share entering a CAP apprenticeship program	0.572	0.641	0.556
	(0.395)	(0.398)	(0.411)
Grade repetition rate	-0.203	-0.057	-0.121
	(0.200)	(0.259)	(0.277)
N	2235	1396	2235

Notes : Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. CH = De Chaisemartin & D'Haultfoeuille, SA = Sun & Abraham.

Table 4: Average Treatment Effect of CE Labels (ATT) for Schools Designated as Lead Schools

As of today, our analysis has focused on all eligible schools and we didn't find much evidence of the positive impact of the CE. However, schools with a larger share of students from disadvantaged backgrounds may respond differently to the program. To explore this

potential heterogeneity, we restrict the sample to schools with an IPS below the median.[13]



Figure 5: Event-study for the overall DNB performance for school who have an IPS $<$ median

For all outcomes, the parallel trends and no-anticipation assumptions hold at the 10% level. Overall, the effects of the program are broadly similar for schools with a larger share of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The main difference lies in the magnitude of the estimated effects. In particular, for these schools, the treatment has a positive effect on the "Très bien" pass rate, although only after four and five periods of exposure. The program increases this outcome by more than 2 percentage points in period 4 and by more than 3 percentage points in period 5.

5 Conclusion and discussion

This paper estimates the effect of the Cités éducatives program, a place-based policy aimed at improving educational outcomes through enhanced coordination among public actors in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Using administrative data and a difference-in-differences design exploiting the staggered introduction of the program, we compare treated schools to similar institutions within priority neighborhoods and the priority education system.

We find no evidence of an average effect of the program on student performance, in line with previous findings on priority education policies (Beffy & Davezies, 2013; Bénabou et al., 2004, 2009; Caille et al., 2016; Gilleece et al., 2025; Matsudaira et al., 2012;

[13]The *Indice de position sociale* (IPS) is an indicator constructed by the *Direction de l'évaluation, de la prospective et de la performance* (DEPP) based on parents' socioeconomic status.

Van der Klaauw, 2008). However, we document heterogeneous effects: the program improves outcomes for lower-performing students while reducing performance at the top of the distribution (but not for schools that have a large share of students from disadvantaged backgrounds), with no detectable impact on tracking decisions. These results are robust across specifications and sample restrictions.

One potential explanation for these results is the limited scale of the financial resources involved. The average funding per student remains low relative to overall education spending (Commission des Finances, 2025), suggesting that coordination alone may be insufficient to generate large average effects. In fact, the budget per student varies substantially across *Cités éducatives*, ranging from €18 to €373 (Cour des comptes, 2025). Moreover, the program covers a very broad age range, from children aged 0 to 25. Given these limited resources, it is therefore not surprising that the estimated effects are relatively small.

Several limitations should be noted. First, the analysis focuses on middle schools in deprived areas, limiting external validity. Second, the data do not allow us to identify the mechanisms underlying the estimated effects, as the program finances a heterogeneous set of local interventions. Third, although the empirical strategy mitigates selection concerns, participation is based on voluntary applications, and residual selection bias cannot be fully excluded. Spillover effects may also attenuate estimated impacts.

Future research could examine the mechanisms driving these effects, including the role of coordination, family involvement, and complementary policies, as well as impacts at other educational levels. In addition, longer-term outcomes—such as access to higher education—remain an open question.

Overall, these results indicate that improving coordination across policies may benefit the most disadvantaged students but is unlikely to substantially affect average outcomes in the absence of additional resources. The findings contribute to the literature on place-based policies and highlight the limits of coordination-based interventions as a standalone policy tool.

References

Andreu, S., Ali, L. B., Blouet, L., Bressoux, P., Charpentier, A., Cioldi, I., Lacroix, A., Lima, L., Murat, F., Odin-Steiner, D., et al. (2021). *Evaluation de l'impact de la taille des classes de cp et de ce1 en rep+ sur les résultats des élèves et les pratiques des enseignants* [Doctoral dissertation, DEPP, ministère de l'Éducation nationale de la jeunesse et des sports.].

Barrera-Osorio, F., García, S., Rodríguez, C., Sánchez, F., & Arbeláez, M. (2018). Concentrating efforts on low-performing schools: Impact estimates from a quasi-experimental design. *Economics of Education Review*, *66*, 73–91.

Beffy, M., & Davezies, L. (2013). Has the" ambition success networks" educational program achieved its ambition? *Annals of Economics and Statistics/Annales d'Economie et de Statistique*, 271–293.

Behaghel, L., De Chaisemartin, C., & Gurgand, M. (2017). Ready for boarding? the effects of a boarding school for disadvantaged students. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, *9*(1), 140–164.

Bellei, C. (2011). Using a regression-discontinuity design to evaluate the causal impact of a compensatory educational program: Evidence on the effect of in-school professional development in low-performing schools in chile. *Center for Advanced Research in Education, University of Chile*.

Bénabou, R., Kramarz, F., & Prost, C. (2009). The french zones d'éducation prioritaire: Much ado about nothing? *Economics of Education Review*, *28*(3), 345–356.

Bénabou, R., Kramarz, F., Prost, C., & Gurgand, M. (2004). Zones d'éducation prioritaire: Quels moyens pour quels résultats? *Économie et statistique*, *380*(1), 3–34.

Borusyak, K., Jaravel, X., & Spiess, J. (2024). Revisiting event-study designs: Robust and efficient estimation. *Review of Economic Studies*, *91*(6), 3253–3285.

Caille, J.-P., Davezies, L., & Garrouste, M. (2016). Les résultats scolaires des collégiens bénéficient-ils des réseaux ambition réussite? *Revue économique*, *67*(3), 639–666.

Callaway, B., & Sant'Anna, P. H. (2021). Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. *Journal of econometrics*, *225*(2), 200–230.

Coleman, J. S. (1966). Equality of educatinal opportunity. *National Center For Educational Statistics*.

Commission des Finances. (2025). *L'éducation prioritaire, une politique publique à repenser (rapport d'information)* (Rapport parlementaire) (Rapport sans compte rendu). Assemblée nationale, France.

Conseil d'État. (2023). *L'usager du premier au dernier kilomètre de l'action publique : un enjeu d'efficacité et une exigence démocratique* (Étude annuelle 2023). Conseil d'État (France).

Cour des comptes. (2018). *L'éducation prioritaire* (Rapport public thématique). Cour des comptes. Paris. https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/leducation-prioritaire

Cour des comptes. (2020). *L'évaluation de l'attractivité des quartiers prioritaires de la politique de la ville* (Rapport public thématique). Cour des comptes. Paris.

Cour des comptes. (2025, December). *Observations définitives (article r. 143-11 du code des juridictions financières) : Les cités éducatives* (tech. rep. No. S2025-1492) (Document d'œuvres finales délibéré le 1er octobre 2025 et publié le 8 décembre 2025). Cour des comptes.

Davezies, L., & Garrouste, M. (2020). More harm than good?: Sorting effects in a compensatory education program. *Journal of Human Resources*, *55*(1), 240–277.

David, J. (2001). Politique de la ville: Chronologie. *Revue française des affaires sociales*, *3*, 15–22.

De Chaisemartin, C., & d'Haultfoeuille, X. (2023). Two-way fixed effects and differences-in-differences with heterogeneous treatment effects: A survey. *The econometrics journal*, *26*(3), C1–C30.

De Ree, J., Maggioni, M. A., Paulle, B., Rossignoli, D., Ruijs, N., & Walentek, D. (2023). Closing the income-achievement gap? experimental evidence from high-dosage tutoring in dutch primary education. *Economics of Education Review*, *94*, 102383.

Gilleece, L., Clerkin, A., & Flannery, D. (2025). Reducing educational disadvantage across post-primary schools: Evidence from the first decade of the deis plan in ireland. *Studies in Educational Evaluation*, *86*, 101466.

Goodman-Bacon, A. (2021). Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing. *Journal of econometrics*, *225*(2), 254–277.

Gorard, S. (2022). What is the evidence on the impact of pupil premium funding on school intakes and attainment by age 16 in england? *British Educational Research Journal*, *48*(3), 446–468.

Gouvernement français. (2020, November). Instruction du gouvernement du 13 novembre 2020 relative à l'extension territoriale du programme interministériel et partenarial des « cités éducatives » [Texte non paru au Journal officiel].

Khiem, P. H., Linh, D. H., Dung, N. D., et al. (2020). Does tuition fee policy reform encourage poor children's school enrolment? evidence from vietnam. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, *66*, 109–124.

Klopfenstein, K. (2004). Advanced placement: Do minorities have equal opportunity? *Economics of Education Review*, *23*(2), 115–131.

Leuven, E., Lindahl, M., Oosterbeek, H., & Webbink, D. (2007). The effect of extra funding for disadvantaged pupils on achievement. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, *89*(4), 721–736.

L'Horty, Y., & Morin, P. (2016). Économie des quartiers prioritaires: Une introduction. *Revue économique*, *67*(3), 373–389.

Malgouyres, C., & Py, L. (2016). Les dispositifs d'exonérations géographiquement ciblées bénéficient-ils aux résidents de ces zones? *Revue économique*, *67*(3), 581–614.

Matsudaira, J. D., Hosek, A., & Walsh, E. (2012). An integrated assessment of the effects of title i on school behavior, resources, and student achievement. *Economics of Education Review*, *31*(3), 1–14.

Murat, F. (1998). Les différentes façons d'évaluer le niveau des élèves en fin de collège: Evaluation et notation des élèves. *Éducation et formations*, *53*, 35–49.

Musterd, S., & Ostendorf, W. (2008). Integrated urban renewal in the netherlands: A critical appraisal. *Urban Research & Practice*, *1*(1), 78–92.

Nielsen, S. A. (2023). Boys left behind: The effects of summer camp and follow-up strategies on academic, personal, and social competencies. *Economics of Education Review*, *93*, 102370.

Prost, C. (2013). Teacher mobility: Can financial incentives help disadvantaged schools to retain their teachers? *Annals of Economics and Statistics/ANNALES D'ÉCONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE*, 171–191.

Romero, R. G., & Noble, M. (2008). Evaluating england's 'new deal for communities' programme using the difference-in-difference method. *Journal of Economic Geography*, *8*(6), 759–778.

Silhol, J., & Wilner, L. (2023). Teachers' desired mobility to disadvantaged schools: Do financial incentives matter? *⟨hal-05354432⟩*.

Stefanou, A. (2022). *L'éducation prioritaire* (Synthèse de la DEPP No. n° 6) (Mise à jour septembre 2025). Ministère de l'Éducation nationale et de la Jeunesse – Direction

de l'évaluation, de la prospective et de la performance (DEPP). Paris. https://www.education.gouv.fr/l-education-prioritaire-414237

Stromboni, T., & Louhab, S. (2024). *Évaluation nationale des cités éducatives : Appropriation du programme en matière de continuité éducative, d'orientation-insertion et de place des familles* (tech. rep. No. 2024/02). INJEP — Institut national de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire. Paris.

Sun, L., & Abraham, S. (2021). Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects. *Journal of econometrics*, *225*(2), 175–199.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development & Urban Institute. (2024). *Choice neighborhoods: An evaluation of outcomes and neighborhood impact* (Evaluation Report) (Evaluation using quasi-experimental methods, including Synthetic Control approaches). U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Washington, DC.

Van der Klaauw, W. (2008). Breaking the link between poverty and low student achievement: An evaluation of title i. *Journal of Econometrics*, *142*(2), 731–756.

Verelst, S., Bakelants, H., Vandevoort, L., & Nicaise, I. (2020). The governance of equity funding schemes for disadvantaged schools: Lessons from national case studies [NESET report].

Appendix



Source : Cour des comptes, d'après les données du ministère de l'éducation nationale

Figure 7: Trends in National Education Spending on Priority Education since 2014 (€ billions)

A Additional Descriptive Statistics

Figure 6: Structure of the CE Program - municipal communication (Source: Municipality of Sevran)

Axis	Project	Costs (€)
Axis 1	Parenting Support Workshops Early childhood structures in the neighborhood meet with families to discuss challenges faced by parents.	1,070
Axis 2	Road Safety in Sevran! Awareness workshops on road safety and risky behaviors.	13,500
	From Sevran to Roland Garros Introducing first-grade classes to Roland Garros.	13,200
	High School – Futuroscope Educational Trip Two-day, one-night trip to Futuroscope park with meetings with technicians and/or engineers from the park.	3,418
	Awareness on Risks of Prostitution and Soliciting Specialists address issues of youth prostitution and soliciting with both professionals and families. A weekly drop-in service named "ado sexo" is provided.	16,667
Axis 3	Middle School – *Musée en Herbe* Introduction to the arts and discovery of Parisian museums on Wednesday afternoons.	2,458
	Sixth- and Fourth-Grade Integration Day	9,160
	Workshops for Students, Teachers, and Parents Parents are invited to participate with their children in workshops to strengthen the connection between school, children, and families.	61,600
	Mini-Stays and Educational Trips Creation of mini-stays from age 3 and reinforcement of existing ones. Two trips organized: All Saints' holidays + Christmas holidays.	36,000
	Foreign Language Skill Development Organization of individual language lessons by a school teacher, including language immersion courses and specialization classes.	2,100
	Sport and Disability Implementation of sports workshops for children with disabilities.	16,100

Table 5: Example of QPV Initiatives: Les Beaudottes Neighborhood

	CE number	€ millions	QPV
2019	80	8,2	164
2020	80	28,8	164
2021	126	36,4	282
2022	208	69,3	479
2023	208	71,1	479
2024	208	78	479
2025	248	86,7	565
2026	302	105,7	646
2027	805	281,7	1609

Executed amounts in € millions (central government share, BOP 147).
Sources: Senate, Cour des comptes, National Assembly, authors' calculations.

Table 6: Rollout of the Cités éducatives Program



Figure 8: Rollout of the 248 Cités éducatives (2020–2025)

Budget (€ millions)	P140	P141	P230	P214	Total Share National Education	CE-P147	%CE
2015	19,874.9	30,912.9	4,810.6	2,273.2	57,871.6		
2016	20,443.4	31,466.2	4,905.6	2,287.7	59,102.9		
2017	21,573.8	32,436.3	5,167.6	2,277.6	61,455.3		
2018	22,000.9	32,916.8	5,418.0	2,331.1	62,666.8		
2019	22,549.4	33,204.0	5,638.9	2,263.9	63,656.2	8.2	
2020	23,101.3	33,452.2	6,041.2	2,188.8	64,783.5	28.8	
2021	23,587.6	33,976.3	6,384.1	2,701.2	66,649.2	36.4	
2022	24,392.0	34,927.0	6,875.0	2,725.0	68,919.0	69.3	0.001%
2023	25,456.0	36,343.0	7,468.0	2,784.0	72,051.0	71.1	0.001%
2024	26,686.0	38,247.0	7,934.0	2,910.0	75,777.0	78	0.001%

Sources: Cour des comptes (2025), Finance Bill for 2025 ('Cohesion of Territories' mission). P140, P141, P230, and P214 refer to budget programs within the French Finance Bill ('Projet de Loi de Finances'). P140 corresponds to general primary and secondary education, P141 to vocational and technical education, P230 to policy actions targeting cohesion and urban policy, and P214 to higher education and research. These codes are used by the French Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Budget to track executed expenditures by program.

Table 7: Education Budget vs. CE Program Budget

TEPP Working Papers 2026

26-9. Who is most at risk? Uncovering the determinants of population vulnerability to heat waves in France
Hamza Bennani, Marc Pourroy

26-8. Gamification and energy savings: Evidence from experiments
Yannick L'Horty, Ngoc-Thao Noet

26-7. Causal impact of the health extension programm on child immunization and nutrition in rural ethiopia : evidence from a retrospective analysis
Gerenew Kassie, Nicolas Moreau

26-6. Gender and age diversity of the workforce. Does it matter for firms' performance ?
Laetitia Challe, Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi

26-5. Where women can have it all? The public sector and the rise of women in the higher deciles of wages in French Overseas Departments
Sandhya Apaya

26-4. Externatity effects of climate adaptation policies in urban areas : the case of green schools in Paris
Sylvain Chareyron, Laetitia Tuffery

26-3. Externality effects of building collapses due to insufficient renovation
Sylvain Chareyron, Léna Monasse, Florent Sari

26-2. The effect of monetary incentives on participation and behavior : an online experiment
Ngoc-Thao Noet, Serge Blondel

26-1. Participatory democracy in question: the case of "The Sea in Debate"
François-Charles Wolff, Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu, Brice Trouillet, Alexia Pigeault, Nicolas Rollo

TEPP Working Papers 2025

25-7. The impact of subsidizing early young innovative companies on their access to capital market
Anna Malessan

25-6. Competitiveness and employment or wage distribution. What do we learn from the corporate and payroll tax cuts policies in France ?
Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi

25-5. Marginal employment as an incentive to find a regular job? A meta-regression analysis approach
Fabrice Gilles

25-4. Improving employability for the least qualified unemployed. Lessons from a new French training program
Héloïse Burlat, Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty

25-3. Production regulation principles and tax reforms
Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann

25-2. Monetary policy transmission and household indebtedness in Australia
Khuderchuluun Batsukh, Nicolas Groshenny, Naveed Javed

25-1. Payroll tax reductions on low wages and minimum wage in France
Julien Albertini, Arthur Poirier, Anthony Terriau

TEPP Working Papers 2024

24-9. Training and job-to-job mobility with transfer fees
Arnaud Chéron, Anthony Terriau

24-8. Corporate taxation and firm heterogeneity
Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise, Anthony Terriau

24-7. Effects of a business support program on firm performances in France
Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi

24-6. Increased fine for repeat offenders and conglomerate dynamics
Armel Jacques

24-5. The valuation of energy efficiency labels in the French housing market
Sylvain Chareyron

24-4. A comprehensive analysis of production efficiency : a tax reform perspective
Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann

24-3. How to measure energy poverty in warm and cold climate territories? A multidimensional approach
Manitra Rakotomena, Olivia Ricci

24-2. Innovating for the good or for the bad. An EU-wide analysis of the impact of technological transformation on job polarisation and unemployment
Ylenia Curci, Nathalie Greenan, Silvia Napolitano

24-1. Is training helpful in boosting the self-confidence and professional integration of young people not in employment, education or training? Results from a randomized experiment
Nicolas Moreau, Alexis Parmentier, Mylène Lebon-Eyquem

TEPP Working Papers 2023

23-8. Dornbusch's overshooting and the systematic component of monetary policy in SOE-SVAR
Nicolas Groshenny, Naveed Javed

23-7. Is participatory democracy in line with social protest? Evidence from French yellow vests movement
Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff

23-6. On-the-job search, life-cycle training and the role of transfer fees
Arnaud Cheron, Anthony Terriau

23-5. Estimating the laffer tax rate on capital income : cross-base responses matter!
Marie-Noëlle Lefebvre, Etienne Lehmann, Michaël Sicsic

23-4. The trickle-down theory: a reality in French sports?
Florian Moussi-Beylie

23.3. Robotization and unbalanced changes in high-skill employment
Lucas Parmentier

23.2. Knowledge transmission in the second part of careers: does formal training matter?
Pierre-Jean Messe, Nathalie Greenan

23-1. Phantom cycles
Arnaud Chéron, Bruno Decreuse

TEPP Working Papers 2022

22-21. Utility services poverty : addressing the problem of household deprivation in Mayotte
Dorothée Charlier, Bérangère Legendre, Olivia Ricci

22-20. The effects of disability benefits on the employment of low-skilled youth : evidence from France
Sylvain Chareyron, Naomie Mahmoudi

22-19. Does gender equality bargaining reduce child penality? Evidence from France
Pierre-Jean Messe, Jérémy Tanguy

22-18. The effect of pro diversity actions on discrimination in the recruitment of large companies : a field experiment
Laetitia Challe, Sylvain Chareyron, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

22-17. Impacts of quota policy and employer obligation to adapt workstations on discrimination against people with disabilities : lesson from an experiment
Sylvain Chareyron, Yannick L'Horty, Philomene Mbaye, Pascale Petit

22-16. Are real merchandise imports per capita a good predictor for the standard of living for the small island world : testing for the imports-led growth and the growth-led imports hypotheses in panels over the period 1970-2019
Jean-François Hoarau, Nicolas Lucic

22-15. Extracting the discrimination components from the callback rates
Emmanuel Duguet, Loïc Du Parquet, Pascale Petit

22-14. Strategic debt in a mixed duopoly: the limited liability effect
Armel Jacques

22-13. Short-time work policies during the COVID-19 pandemic
Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise, Arthur Poirier, Anthony Terriau

22-12. Immigration and labour market flows
Andri Chassamboulli, Idriss Fontaine, Ismael Galvez-Iniesta

22-11. Short-term impact of tropical cyclones in Madagascar : evidence from nightlight data
Idriss Fontaine, Sabine Garabedian, Maël Jammes

22-10. The current and future costs of tropical cyclones: A case study of La Réunion
Idriss Fontaine, Sabine Garabedian, Helene Veremes

22-9. Wealth and income responses to dividend taxation : Evidence from France
Marie-Noëlle Lefebvre, Eddy Zanoutene

22-8. Soccer labour market equilibrium and efficient training of talents
Marnix Amand, Arnaud Chéron, Florian Pelgrin, Anthony Terriau

22.7. Using short-term jobs as a way to fin a regular job. What kind of role for local context?
Fabrice Gilles, Sabina Issehnane, Florent Sari

22-6. Gender and age diversity. Does it matter for firms' productivity?
Laetitia Challe, Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi

22-5. How wages respond to the job-finding and job-to-job transition rates? Evidence from New Zealand administrative data
Christopher Ball, Nicolas Groshenny, Özer Karagedikli, Murat Özbilgind, Finn Robinsona

22-4. Endogenous timing of technological choices of flexibility in a mixed duopoly
Armel Jacques

22-3. Reducing ethnic discrimination through formal warning : evidence from two combined field experiments
Sylvain Chareyron, Yannick L'Horty, Souleymane Mbaye, Pascale Petit

22-2. Cream skimming and Discrimination in access to medical care: a field experiment
Sylvain Chareyron, Yannick L'horty, Pascale Petit

22-1. Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
Kevin Spiritus, Etienne Lehmann, Sander Renes, Floris T. Zoutman

TEPP Working Papers 2021

21-11. Intermittent collusive agreements : antitrust policy and business cycles
Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques

21-10. Endogenous breadth of collusive agreements : an application to flexible technological choices
Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques

21-9. How to tax different incomes?
Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann

21-8. Does optimal capital taxation under stochastic returns to savings
Eddy Zanoutene

21-7. Does the gender mix influence collective bargaining on gender equality? Evidence from France
Anne-Sophie Bruno, Nathalie Greenan, Jérémy Tanguy

21-6. The effects of the non-financial component of business accelerators
Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi

21-5. Organisational changes and long term sickness absence and injury leave
Mohamed Ali Ben Halima, Nathalie Greenan, Joseph Lanfranchi

21-4. The unexplored discriminations towards youth : equal access to goods and services
David Gray, Yannick L'Horty, Souleymane Mbaye, Pascale Petit

21-3. The zero effect of income tax on the timing of birth: some evidence on French data
Nicolas Moreau

21-2. Tropical cyclones and fertility : new evidence from Madagascar
Idriss Fontaine, Sabine Garabedian, David Nortes-Martinez, Hélène Vérèmes

21-1. On the heterogeneous impacts of the COVID-19 lockdown on US unemployment
Malak Kandoussi, François Langot

TEPP Working Papers 2020

20-8. COVID-19 mortality and health expenditures across European countries: The positive correlation puzzle
Serge Blondel, Radu Vranceanu

20-7. Measuring discrimination in the labour market
Emmanuel Duguet

20-6. The effects of age on educational performances at the end of primary school: cross-sectional and regression discontinuity approach applications from Reunion Island
Daniel Rakotomalala

20-5. Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization
Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques

20-4. Is international tourism responsible for the pandemic of COVID19? A preliminary cross-country analysis with a special focus on small islands
Jean-François Hoarau

20-3. Does labor income react more to income tax or means tested benefit reforms?
Michaël Sicsic

20-2. Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
Sébastien Ménard

20-1. The specific role of agriculture for economic vulnerability of small island spaces
Stéphane Blancard, Maximin Bonnet, Jean-François Hoarau

TEPP Working Papers 2019

19-8. The impact of benefit sanctions on equilibrium wage dispersion and job vacancies
Sebastien Menard

19-7. Employment fluctuations, job polarization and non-standard work: Evidence from France and the US
Olivier Charlot, Idriss Fontaine, Thepthida Sopraseuth

19-6. Counterproductive hiring discrimination against women: Evidence from French correspondence test
Emmanuel Duguet, Loïc du Parquet, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

19-5. Inefficient couples: Non-minimization of the tax burden among French cohabiting couples
Olivier Bargain, Damien Echevin, Nicolas Moreau, Adrien Pacifico

19-4. Seeking for tipping point in the housing market: evidence from a field experiment
Sylvain Chareyron, Samuel Gorohouna, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit, Catherine Ris

19-3. Testing for redlining in the labor market
Yannick L'Horty, Mathieu Bunel, Pascale Petit

19-2. Labour market flows: Accounting for the public sector
Idriss Fontaine, Ismael Galvez-Iniesta, Pedro Gomes, Diego Vila-Martin

19-1. The interaction between labour force participation of older men and their wife: lessons from France
Idriss Fontaine

TEPP Working Papers 2018

18-15. Be healthy, be employed: a comparison between the US and France based on a general equilibrium model
Xavier Fairise, François Langot, Ze Zhong Shang

18-14. Immigrants' wage performance in the routine biased technological change era: France 1994-2012
Catherine Laffineur, Eva Moreno-Galbis, Jeremy Tanguy, Ahmed Tritah

18-13. Welfare cost of fluctuations when labor market search interacts with financial frictions
Elini Iliopulos, François Langot, Thepthida Sopraseuth

18-12. Accounting for labor gaps
François Langot, Alessandra Pizzo

18-11. Unemployment fluctuations over the life cycle
Jean-Olivier Hairault, François Langot, Thepthida Sopraseuth

18-10. Layoffs, Recalls and Experience Rating
Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise

18-9. Environmental policy and health in the presence of labor market imperfections
Xavier Pautrel

18-8. Identity mistakes and the standard of proof
Marie Obidzinski, Yves Oytana

18-7. Presumption of innocence and deterrence
Marie Obidzinski, Yves Oytana

18-6. Ethnic Discrimination in Rental Housing Market: An Experiment in New Caledonia
Mathieu Bunel, Samuel Gorohouna, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit, Catherine Ris

18-5. Evaluating the impact of firm tax credits. Results from the French natural experiment CICE
Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty, Ferhat Mihoubi, Xi Yang

18-4. Impact of type 2 diabetes on health expenditure: an estimation based on individual administrative data
François-Olivier Baudot , Anne-Sophie Aguadé,Thomas Barnay, Christelle Gastaldi-Ménager, Anne Fargot-Campagna

18-3. How does labour market history influence the access to hiring interviews?
Emmanuel Duguet, Rémi Le Gall, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

18-2. Occupational mobility and vocational training over the life cycle
Anthony Terriau

18-1. Retired, at last? The short-term impact of retirement on health status in France
Thomas Barnay, Eric Defebvre

TEPP Working Papers 2017

17-11. Hiring discrimination against women: distinguishing taste based discrimination from statistical discrimination
Emmanuel Duguet, Loïc du Parquet, Pascale Petit

17-10. Pension reforms, older workers' employment and the role of job separation and finding rates in France
Sarah Le Duigou, Pierre-Jean Messe

17-9. Healthier when retiring earlier? Evidence from France
Pierre-Jean Messe, François-Charles Wolff

17-8. Revisting Hopenhayn and Nicolini's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions
Sebastien Menard, Solenne Tanguy

17-7. Ethnic Gaps in Educational Attainment and Labor-Market Outcomes: Evidence from France
Gabin Langevin, David Masclet, Fabien Moizeau, Emmanuel Peterle

17-6. Identifying preference-based discrimination in rental market: a field experiment in Paris
Mathieu Bunel, Yannick L'Horty, Loïc du Parquet, Pascale Petit

17-5. Chosen or Imposed? The location strategies of households
Emilie Arnoult, Florent Sari

17-4. Optimal income taxation with composition effects
Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann

17-3. Labor Market Effects of Urban Riots: an experimental assessment
Emmanuel Duguet, David Gray, Yannick L'Horty, Loic du Parquet, Pascale Petit

17-2. Does practicing literacy skills improve academic performance in first-year university students? Results from a randomized experiment
Estelle Bellity, Fabrices Gilles, Yannick L'Horty

17-1. Raising the take-up of social assistance benefits through a simple mailing: evidence from a French field experiment
Sylvain Chareyron, David Gray, Yannick L'Horty

TEPP Working Papers 2016

16-8. Endogenous wage rigidities, human capital accumulation and growth
Ahmed Tritah

16-7. Harder, better, faster...yet stronger? Working conditions and self-declaration of chronic diseases
Eric Defebvre

16-6. The influence of mental health on job retention
Thomas Barnay, Eric Defebvre

16-5. The effects of breast cancer on individual labour market outcomes: an evaluation from an administrative panel
Thomas Barnay, Mohamed Ali Ben Halima, Emmanuel Duguet, Christine Le Clainche, Camille Regaert

16-4. Expectations, Loss Aversion, and Retirement Decisions in the Context of the 2009 Crisis in Europe
Nicolas Sirven, Thomas Barnay

16-3. How do product and labor market regulations affect aggregate employment, inequalities and job polarization? A general equilibrium approach
Julien Albertini, Jean-Olivier Hairault, François Langot, Thepthida Sopraseuth

16-2. Access to employment with age and gender: results of a controlled experiment Laetitia Challe, Florent Fremigacci, François Langot, Yannick L'Horty, Loïc Du Parquet, Pascale Petit

16-1. An evaluation of the 1987 French Disabled Workers Act: Better paying than hiring
Thomas Barnay, Emmanuel Duguet, Christine Le Clainche, Yann Videau

TEPP Working Papers 2015

15-10. Optimal Income Taxation with Unemployment and Wage Responses: A Sufficient Statistics Approach
Kory Kroft, Kavan Kucko, Etienne Lehmann, Johannes Schmieder

15-9. Search frictions and (in) efficient vocational training over the life-cycle
Arnaud Chéron, Anthony Terriau

15-8. Absenteeism and productivity: the experience rating applied to employer contributions to health insurance
Sébastien Ménard, Coralia Quintero Rojas

15-7. Take up of social assistance benefits: the case of homeless
Sylvain Chareyron

15-6. Spatial mismatch through local public employment agencies. Answers from a French quasi-experiment
Mathieu Bunel, Elisabeth Tovar

15-5. Transmission of vocational skills at the end of career: horizon effect and technological or organisational change
Nathalie Greenan, Pierre-Jean Messe

15-4. Protecting biodiversity by developing bio-jobs: A multi-branch analysis with an application on French data
Jean De Beir, Céline Emond, Yannick L'Horty, Laetitia Tuffery

15-3. Profit-Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data Between 2000 and 2007
Noélie Delahaie, Richard Duhautois

15-2. A meta-regression analysis on intergenerational transmission of education: publication bias and genuine empirical effect
Nicolas Fleury, Fabrice Gilles

15-1. Why are there so many long-term unemployed in Paris?
Yannick L'Horty, Florent Sari

TEPP Working Papers 2014

14-14. Hiring discrimination based on national origin and the competition between employed and unemployed job seekers
Guillaume Pierné

14-13. Discrimination in Hiring: The curse of motorcycle women
Loïc Du Parquet, Emmanuel Duguet, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

14-12. Residential discrimination and the ethnic origin: An experimental assessment in the Paris suburbs
Emmanuel Duguet, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

14-11. Discrimination based on place of residence and access to employment
Mathieu Bunel, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

14-10. Rural Electrification and Household Labor Supply: Evidence from Nigeria
Claire Salmon, Jeremy Tanguy

14-9. Effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: theory and empirical evidence from EU countries
Eva Moreno-Galbis, Ahmed Tritah

14-8. Health, Work and Working Conditions: A Review of the European Economic Literature
Thomas Barnay

14-7. Labour mobility and the informal sector in Algeria: a cross-sectional comparison (2007-2012)
Philippe Adair, Youghourta Bellache

14-6. Does care to dependent elderly people living at home increase their mental health?
Thomas Barnay, Sandrine Juin

14-5. The Effect of Non-Work Related Health Events on Career Outcomes: An Evaluation in the French Labor Market
Emmanuel Duguet, Christine le Clainche

14-4. Retirement intentions in the presence of technological change: Theory and evidence from France
Pierre-Jean Messe, Eva Moreno-Galbis, Francois-Charles Wolff

14-3. Why is Old Workers' Labor Market more Volatile? Unemployment Fluctuations over the Life-Cycle
Jean-Olivier Hairault, François Langot, Thepthida Sopraseuth

14-2. Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage
Frédéric Gavrel

14-1. Disparities in taking sick leave between sectors of activity in France: a longitudinal analysis of administrative data
Thomas Barnay, Sandrine Juin, Renaud Legal

TEPP Working Papers 2013

13-9. An evaluation of the impact of industrial restructuring on individual human capital accumulation in France (1956-1993)
Nicolas Fleury, Fabrice Gilles

13-8. On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
José de Sousa, Xavier Fairise

13-7. Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance
Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise

13-6. Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments
Etienne Lehmann, Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy

13-5. Beyond the labour income tax wedge: The unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity
Etienne Lehmann, Claudio Lucifora, Simone Moriconi, Bruno Van Der Linden

13-4. Discrimination based on place of residence and access to employment
Mathieu Bunel, Emilia Ene Jones, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

13-3. The determinants of job access channels: evidence from the youth labor market in France
Jihan Ghrairi

13-2. Capital mobility, search unemployment and labor market policies: The case of minimum wages
Frédéric Gavrel

13-1. Effort and monetary incentives in Nonprofit et For-Profit Organizations
Joseph Lanfranchi, Mathieu Narcy

TEPP Working Papers 2012

12-18. Ageing, changes and quality of working life
Nathalie Greenan, Mathieu Narcy, Serge Volkoff

12-17. Labor Income Responds Differently to Income-Tax and Payroll-Tax Reforms
Etienne Lehmann, François Marical, Laurence Rioux

12-16. New Evidence of Ethnic and Gender discriminations in the French Labor Market using experimental data: A ranking extension of correspondence testings
Emmanuel Duguet, Loïc Du Parquet, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

12-15. The Economics of Performance Appraisals
Marc-Arthur Diaye, Nathalie Greenan

12-14. Effect of Age on the Wage Distribution: A Quantitative Evaluation Using US Data
Sarah Le Duigou

12-13. Simultaneous causality between health status and employment status within the population aged 30-59 in France
Thomas Barnay, François Legendre

12-12.The Effects of Reduced Social Security Contributions on Employment: an Evaluation of the 2003 French Reform
Matthieu Bunel, Yannick L'Horty

12-11. Has the Quality of Work Improved in the EU-15 between 1995 and 2005 ?
Nathalie Greenan, Ekaterina Kalugina, Emmanuelle Walkowiak

12-10. Dynamically consistent CEU preferences
André Lapied, Pascal Toquebeuf

12-9. A note on "Re-examining the law of iterated expectations for Choquet decision makers"
André Lapied, Pascal Toquebeuf

12-8. Job Polarization in Aging Economies
Eva Moreno - Galbis, Thepthida Sopraseuth

12-7. Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
Jean-Olivier Hairault, François Langot, Sébastien Ménard, Thepthida Sopraseuth

12-6. Entry mode choice and target firm selection : private and collective incentive analysis
Kai Zhao

12-5. Advantageous Semi-Collusion Revisited : A Note
Kai Zhao

12-4. Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to train : The case of French older workers
Pierre-Jean Messe, Bénédicte Rouland

12-3. Hedonic model of segmentation with horizontal differentiated housing
Masha Maslianskaia-Pautrel

12-2. How to account for changes in the size of Sports Leagues : The Iso Competitive Balance Curves
Jean-Pascal Gayant, Nicolas Le Pape

12-1. What drives Health Care Expenditure in France since 1950? A time-series study with structural breaks and nonlinearity approaches
Thomas Barnay, Olivier Damette

TEPP Working Papers 2011

11-10. Routinization-Biased Technical Change, Globalization and Labor Market Polarization : Does Theory Fit the Facts?
Jaewon Jung, Jean Mercenier

11-9. What is the natural Weight of the Current Old?
Damien Gaumont, Daniel Leonard

11-8. Productivity, Capital and Labor in Labor-Managed and Convention Firms
Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Perotin, Monica Gago

11-7. Fiscal Shocks in a Two Sector Open Economy
Olivier Cardi, Romain Restout

11-6. How important is innovation? A Bayesian factor-augmented productivity model on panel data
Georges Besson, Jean-Michel Etienne, Pierre Mohnen

11-5. The Fateful Triangle : Complementarities between product, process and organisational innovation in the UK and France
Gérard Ballot, Fathi Fakhfakh, Fabrice Galia, Ammon Salter

11-4. Residential Discrimination and Ethnic Origin: An experimental assessment in the Paris suburbs
Emmanuel Duguet, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

11-3. Why is there a faster return to work near the border?
Jonathan Bougard

11-2. The effect of place of residence on access to employment: a field experiment on qualified young job applicants in Ile-de-France
Yannick L'Horty, Emmanuel Duguet, Loïc du Parquet, Pascale Petit, Florent Sari

11-1. The French "Earned Income Supplement" (RSA) and back-to-work incentives
Denis Anne, Yannick L'Horty

TEPP Working Papers 2010

10-21. Employment Protection Legislation and Adverse Selection at the Labor Market Entry
Anne Bucher, Sébastien Ménard

10-20. Endogenous Job Destructions and the Distribution of Wages
Arnaud Chéron, Bénédicte Rouland

10-19. Bankruptcy Risk, Product Market Competition and Horizontal Mergers
Bernard Franck, Nicolas Le Pape

10-18. Cost-saving or Cost-enhancing Mergers: the Impact of the Distribution of Roles in Oligopoly
Nicolas Le Pape, Kai Zhao

10-17. Fostering the potential endogenous development of European regions: a spatial dynamic panel data analysis of the Cohesion Policy on regional convergence over the period 1980-2005
Salima Bouayad-Agha, Nadine Turpin, Lionel Védrine

10-16. The dynamics of youth labor market integration
Anne Bucher

10-15. On the impact of the TFP growth on the employment rate: does training on-the-job matter?
Eva Moreno-Galbis

10-14. Young-in Old-out: a new evaluation
Michela Bia, Pierre-Jean Messe, Roberto Leombruni

10-13. Hiring Practices, Employment Protection and Temporary Jobs
Anne Bucher

10-12. Pre Entry Motives into Entrepreneurship and Post Entry Entrepreneurial Orientation
Jean Bonnet, Nicolas Le Pape

10-11. Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience
Pierre-Jean Messe

10-10. Returns to firm-provided training in France: Evidence on mobility and wages
Arnaud Chéron, Bénédicte Rouland, François-Charles Wolff

10-9. Entrepreneurial motives and performance: Why might better educated entrepreneurs be less successful?
Arnab Bhattacharjee, Jean Bonnet, Nicolas Le Pape, Régis Renault

10-8. Ageing, chronic conditions and the evolution of future drugs expenditures
Thomas Barnay, Sophie Thiébaut, Bruno Ventelou

10-7. Health and Early Retirement: Evidence from French Data for individuals
Thomas Barnay, Karine Briard

10-6. What are Entrepreneurs' Objectives When Starting a New Business?
Lionel Désiage

10-5. The effect of social security payroll tax reductions on employment and wages: an evaluation of the 2003 French reform
Matthieu Bunel, Fabrice Gilles, Yannick L'Horty

10-4. Do Public Subsidies Have an Impact on New Firm Survival? An Empirical Study with French Data
Lionel Désiage, Richard Duhautois, Dominique Redor

10-3. Housing ownership, social housing and unemployment: an econometric analysis of the Paris area
Emmanuel Duguet, Yannick L'Horty, Florent Sari

10-2. Working hours and Work-Life Balance Satisfaction in Couple
Nathalie Georges, Dominique Méda, Danièle Trancart

10-1. Are young French jobseekers of ethnic immigrant origin discriminated against? A controlled experiment in the Paris area
Emmanuel Duguet, Noam Leandri, Yannick L'Horty, Pascale Petit

The TEPP Institute

The CNRS **Institute for Theory and Evaluation of Public Policies** (the TEPP Institute, FR n°2042 CNRS) gathers research centres specializing in economics and sociology:

- L'**Equipe de Recherche sur l'Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique** (Research Team on Use of Individuals Data in connection with economic theory), **ERUDITE**, University of Paris-Est Créteil, University of Gustave Eiffel;
- Le **Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques** (Research Centre focused on the analysis of economic policy and its foundations and implications), **EPEE**, University of Evry Paris-Saclay ;
- Le **Centre Pierre Naville** (Research on Work and Urban Policies), **CPN**, University of Evry Paris-Saclay
- Le **Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux** (Group on Analysis of Wage Levels and Trajectories), **GAINS**, Le Mans University
- Le **Centre de Recherches en Economie et en Management**, (Research centre in Economics and Management), **CREM**, University of Rennes 1, University of Caen Basse-Normandie ;
- Le **Groupe de Recherche ANgevin en Économie et Management** (Angevin Research Group in Economics and Management), **GRANEM**, University of Angers ;
- Le **Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit** (Research centre in Economics and Law) **CRED**, University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas ;
- Le **Laboratoire d'Economie et de Management Nantes-Atlantique** (Laboratory of Economics and Management of Nantes-Atlantique) **LEMNA**, Nantes University ;
- Le **Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'étude du politique Hannah Arendt – Paris-Est** (The East Paris Hannah Arendt Interdisciplinary Laboratory of Political Studies), **LIPHA-PE**, University of Paris-Est Créteil and University of Gustave Eiffel ;
- Le **Centre d'Economie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (**Centre for Economics and Management of the Indian Ocean), **CEMOI**, University of La Réunion ;
- Le **Laboratoire d'économie de Poitiers** (Laboratory of Economics of Poitiers), **LéP**, University of Poitiers ;
- L'UMR **Structures et marchés agricoles, ressources et territoires** (Research unit Structures and Markets in Agriculture, Resources and Territories), **SMART**, INRAE, Agro Rennes-Angers Institute ;
- Le **Centre de recherche en économie et en droit sur le développement insulaire** (Research Centre for Economics, Law and Island Development), **CREDDI**, University of the Antilles.
- L'**Institut de Recherche en Gestion et en Economie** (Institute for Research in Management and economics), **IREGE**, University Savoie Mont Blanc

TEPP brings together 300 teacher-researchers and 100 doctoral students. It is both one of the main academic operators in the evaluation of public policies in France, and the largest multidisciplinary federation of research on work and employment. It responds to the demand for impact assessment of social programs using advanced technologies combining theoretical and econometric modeling, qualitative research techniques and controlled experiences.